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ABSTRACT 
Intrapreneurship Infrastructure for Industrial Companies Pursuing New Ventures 
Carlo Stephen Ciliberti, Jr. 
Joseph P. Martin, PhD 
 
 
 
Corporations that foresee diminishing markets for their traditional goods and services must find new 
products or markets to stay competitive.  Technology based industrial firms with production assets usually 
foster a culture of continuous new product improvement and development, but this will not solve the problem 
of a diminishing market, e.g. Defense.  Future prosperity of the entity may depend upon either entering or 
creating new markets.  The goal is to develop new systems that leverage assets, corporate culture, and also, 
address the prevailing public context. 
Key corporate assets are mid-level engineers who have both technical and management savvy, and 
also, understand the relationship between career and corporate success.  They are the ideal candidates to form 
groups of intrapreneurs to use the resources of their corporate entity to develop and implement innovative 
concepts.  This is often done for new products anyway, but to enter new markets with a particular competitive 
context, or to develop systems to serve emerging markets, a fresh, lean, new venture subdivision might be 
required.  This dissertation describes a new process for industrial corporate engineers taking a concept, and 
determining if it is viable to propose to senior leadership to form a new intrapreneural venture within the 
corporation.  Proposals involving consideration of technical, managerial, social and political elements 
leveraging long-term system operation solutions are emphasized.  Since competitors realize similar 
opportunities, understanding the advantages and shortfalls of corporate culture is critical. 
The focus in this dissertation is renewable energy and the unique way to produce, manage and 
deliver products that are already in demand as either fuel or power.  The context is public support and decision 
making that considers many factors beyond traditional cost vs. revenue benefit for the provider and direct 
user only.  Positive and negative external impacts influence decisions and impact economic analysis through 
subsidies and guaranteed market share.  There are three critical engineering issues with meteorologically 
based renewable power:  mis-match between supply and demand; dispersed generation; and distance to urban 
xxi 
markets.  However, in agricultural areas with abundant natural resources, the concerns with these critical 
engineering issues are mitigated, even if they are distributed at low intensity.  Moreover, such areas have 
byproducts that may be used as feedstock to produce fuels that can compensate for the troughs in power 
production, be used directly, or both.    
An integrated system of matching renewable power to agricultural demand is geographically based.  
The example used here is the Northern High Plains, a rich source of wind power.  A flyover reveals that 
thousands of acres in the Dakotas is used for dairy and oilseeds, both with high local energy demand and 
production of organic byproducts.  Power is now supplied by locally based Rural Electrical Associations 
(REAs), which only distribute the power produced primarily by coal-fired power plants using the Missouri 
and Red Rivers for evaporative cooling.  In the current context, this presents the opportunity for an integrated 
system to provide REAs with power from local sources, and also produce biogas fuel for power production 
and local heating.  Furthermore, it may be possible to use excess renewable power to process biogas or seed 
oil for sale as motor fuel, or export as gas.  A significant feature of such an integrated system is long-term 
operation and system integration.  Hence, industrial firms may have an institutional advantage in competition 
with traditional infrastructure EPC (Engineering-Procurement-Construction) firms. 
The process and steps taken by a cadre of engineers in an industrial corporation to develop an 
intrapreneural proposal from a basic idea is described in this dissertation using the integrated rural renewables 
facility and operating entity as an example.  Not only are technical, organizational, managerial and financial 
issues intertwined, but an immense amount of research in unfamiliar fields (agriculture, climate, etc.) is 
required to develop a unique and technically competitive offering.   
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
In a comprehensive study of more than six million U.S. firms, Stubbart and Knight noted that only 
a tiny fraction of firms live to age 40.  For example, for firms founded in 1976, only 10% survived 10 years 
later, leading them to conclude that “Despite their size, their vast financial and human resources, average 
large firms do not ‘live’ as long as ordinary Americans” (O’Reilly et. al, 2009).  Another statistic shows that 
one-third of the firms in the Fortune 500 in 1970 no longer existed in 1983.  Studies of organizational 
mortality have revealed that large firms have an estimated residual life expectancy from 5.8 to 14.6 years.  
Given large firms experience, financial capabilities, core competencies, strategic assets, etc. – why aren’t 
large firms more successful?  And what have the firms that do survive, do differently from the norm? 
(O’Reilly et. al, 2009).  The difference points to Intrapreneurship and the ability to explore and capitalize on 
new ventures that are strategically aligned with the company’s core competencies. 
Corporations experiencing diminishing traditional markets must reposition themselves to develop 
new markets to stay competitive.  Forward-thinking corporations rely on internal entrepreneurial efforts to 
alter an organization's status quo, harness the energies of talented renegades, and give sponsorship to 
promising businesses that are unrelated to the company's cash cow (Tarkahashi, 2000).  Many mid-level 
engineers within such companies are both technically and management savvy, and also understand the 
relationship between career and corporate success.  They are ideal candidates to form groups of intrapreneurs 
to develop and implement innovative concepts using the corporate resources of a large industrial entity in a 
fresh, lean new venture subdivision.  "Look back at any great business or invention at just about any big 
company and you can find that intrapreneurs created it," says Gifford Pinchot, author of Intrapreneuring.  
Mr. Pinchot finds that 30 percent of large companies now provide seed funds that finance in-house 
entrepreneurial efforts (Pinchot, 1985). 
However, studies such as by Duncan et. al. (2001) describe corporate problems trying to encourage 
and nurture intrapreneurship since few organizations are genuinely committed to attracting, hiring, and 
developing the creative talent they will need in the future.  Creative people, while possessing the traits and 
characteristics ideal for intrapreneurship, also exhibit traits conducive to disrupting established corporate 
order by experimenting with new ways of doing things.  Corporate strategy based on principles of 
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responsibility relating to ability and reward related to service can have a positive influence on 
intrapreneurship as practiced more than 50 years ago by Henry Dennison at Dennison Manufacturing 
(Duncan, 2001).  Even though intrapreneurs may desire autonomy and financial freedom more than monetary 
rewards, they will not be satisfied to generate ideas that give others profit without an equitable share of the 
payoff.  To believe that intrapreneurs do not need money is to guarantee that that people with ideas will do 
their creating in their garages, for a competitor, or both.  Another corporate determent to intrapreneurship is 
that the focus on short term results and the prevailing view of the professional manager as an agent of owners, 
ensure that people who begin as intrapreneurs will find it necessary to become entrepreneurs if their ideas 
are to provide any personal benefits other than steady employment (Duncan, 2001).   
This dissertation describes a process that can be used as a guide for intrapreneurs and corporations 
who take an idea from conception to corporate senior leadership for approval such that a new venture can be 
established within the corporation.  The intrapreneural process, which is the objective of the research, was 
developed through intrapreneurship exploration including investigations on failed intrapreneural new 
ventures; and examinations on successful intrapreneural new ventures.  The process will be described through 
the development of an idea of establishing an integrated system to supply rural electric cooperatives with 
power and fuel using renewable resources from an engineer inside a large industrial corporation as a response 
to the opportunity presented by the public for support of sustainable and renewable energy initiatives will be 
investigated.  Specifically, the High Plains of the United States which are a rich source of wind power and 
biomass feedstock, but are distant from urban markets, and distributed at low intensity will be analyzed to 
determine the feasibility of a new venture to use local sources to satisfy rural residential and industrial / 
agricultural power demand and also to process fuels for local and export sales. Excess wind power can be 
converted to and stored as marketable biofuels when peak load is less than peak energy output.  The process 
and steps taken by the engineers and the corporation to analyze and develop this idea into a viable new 
venture opportunity will be presented thru this example. 
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CHAPTER 2:  INTRAPRENEURSHIP – LEARNING FROM PAST SUCCESSES 
 
IBM is one such company that has survived, even after the company went from being hugely 
successful to the brink of bankruptcy after 75 years being in business.  IBM was able to return to success and 
profitability by realigning itself and incorporating intrapreneurship to explore and capitalize on new ventures 
that are strategically aligned with the company’s core competencies.   
 
2.1  History of IBM 
 
In 1900, the International Time Recording Company (ITR) was created by George Fairchild by 
combining the Bundy Manufacturing Company, Willard & Fricke Manufacturing Group and Standard Time 
Stamp Company (Antique Clocks Guy, 2015).  The Bundy Manufacturing Company was incorporated in 
1889 by Willard L. Bundy who invented the time recording clock in 1888 (IBM, 2015).  Willard & Fricke 
Manufacturing Group was formed in 1894 by J. L. Willard and F. A. Frick of Rochester, New York.  They 
developed the first card time recorder.  The Standard Time Stamp Company also manufactured time stamps 
and a card reader (IBM, 2015).  All of these three companies had commonality with respect to recording time 
clocks, the kind factory workers would punch on the way in and out of work.  The clocks helped employers 
keep track of hours worked and wages (IBM, 2015).  
On June 16, 1911, the Computing-Tabulating-Recording Company (CTR) was created by the 
merger of The International Time Recording Company, Computing Scale Company, and the Tabulating 
Machine Company.  Based in New York City, the company had 1,300 employees and offices and plants in 
Endicott and Binghamton, New York, Dayton, Ohio, Detroit, Michigan, Washington, D.C., and Toronto, 
Ontario (1BM, 2015).   The companies’ combined revenue for fiscal year 1910 was "excess of $950,000” 
(Madrigal, 2011). 
Prior to the formation of CTR, Herman Hollerith, who formed the Tabulating Machine Company, 
won a contest sponsored by the U.S. Census Bureau to find a more efficient means of tabulating census data 
after recognizing that the traditional counting methods were inadequate.  Traditional counting methods were 
deemed inadequate as a result of the influx of new immigrants entering the United States during the height 
4 
of the Industrial Revolution.  Hollerith was a Census Bureau statistician and invented the Punch Card 
Tabulating Machine which used an electric current to sense holes in punched cards and keep a running total 
of data.  Not only could the machines count faster, but they could understand information in new ways.  For 
record keeping, a single card, about three inches by seven inches, could be punched with holes that formed 
an information portrait of a person, complete with data such as city of residence, age, nationality, job and 
more. The millions of cards were able to be sorted and counted to determine such statistics as how many 
teachers lived in Chicago, Illinois, or count any other subset of the population.  Society could now learn new 
statistical information as never before, and at speeds no one thought possible (IBM, 2015). 
In 1914 Thomas J. Watson, Sr., was named general manager of CTR.  Watson implemented a series 
of effective business tactics: generous sales incentives, a focus on customer service, an insistence on well-
groomed, dark-suited salesmen and an evangelical fervor for instilling company pride and loyalty in every 
worker.  Watson boosted company spirit with employee sports teams, family outings and a company band.  
He preached a positive outlook, and his favorite slogan, "THINK," became a mantra for C-T-R's employees.  
Within 11 months of joining C-T-R, Watson became its president.  The company focused on providing large-
scale, custom-built tabulating solutions for businesses, leaving the market for small office products to others.  
During Watson's first four years, revenues more than doubled to $9 million. He also expanded the company's 
operations to Europe, South America, Asia and Australia (IBM, 2015).  
Watson emphasized research and engineering and remained at the helm for the next twenty years, 
turning the company into a multi-national entity foreseeing that information technology had an ever-expanding 
future and literally created the information industry (Bellis, 2015).   
In 1924, Watson changed the company’s name to International Business Machines Corporation or 
IBM.  From the beginning, IBM defined itself not by selling products, which ranged from commercial scales 
to punch card tabulators, but by its research and development.  IBM was also known as "Big Blue" after the 
color of its logo (Bellis, 2015).   
IBM began designing and manufacturing calculators in the 1930s, using the technology of their own 
punch card processing equipment (Bellis, 2015).   In 1935, the United States adopted Social Security and 
IBM's punched card machines helped with the massive record keeping required for tens of millions of 
Americans.  Businesses quickly realized that the portraits on those cards didn’t have to be citizens, but could 
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be company product, freight car on a rail line, or an insurance customer.  Early adopters of the electric 
tabulation method included the Eastman Kodak Company, which used a tabulating machine to keep track of 
customers and salesmen (Madrigal, 2011).   
During the Great Depression of the 1930s, IBM managed to grow while the rest of the U.S. economy 
floundered.  During these perilous times, Thomas J. Watson, Sr. took care of his employees.  The IBM 
Schoolhouse was completed at Endicott, NY in 1933 to provide education and training for employees.  IBM 
was among the first corporations to provide group life insurance (1934), survivor benefits (1935) and paid 
vacations (1937).  While most businesses had shut down, Watson kept his workers busy producing new 
machines even while demand was slack.  Thanks to the resulting large inventory of equipment, IBM was 
ready when the Social Security Act of 1935 brought the company a landmark government contract to 
maintain employment records for 26 million people.  It was called "the biggest accounting operation of all 
time," and it went so well that orders from other U.S. government departments quickly followed.  
When World War II began, all IBM facilities were placed at the disposal of the U.S. government.  
IBM's product line expanded to include more than three dozen major ordnance items including bombsights, 
rifles and engines.  IBM also helped keep track of vital statistics such as U.S. freight traffic.  In addition, 
Thomas Watson, Sr. set a nominal one percent profit on these ordnance products and used the profit money 
to establish a fund for IBM widows and orphans resulting from war casualties (IBM, 2015).  In 1944, IBM 
co-developed its first computer, the Automated Sequence Controlled Calculator (aka Mark I), with Harvard 
University which was used by the U.S. Navy to calculate gun trajectories (Madrigal, 2011).   It was the first 
machine that could execute long computations automatically.  The Mark 1 was over 50 feet long, eight feet 
high and weighing almost five tons.  It took less than a second to solve an addition problem but about six 
seconds for multiplication and twice as long for division (IBM, 2015). 
The 1950’s were marked by IBM’s own reckoning, “The Golden Age of IBM”.  In 1952, Thomas 
J. Watson, Jr., became the president of the company (Madrigal, 2011) and IBM introduced the IBM 701, its 
first large computer based on the vacuum tube.  The tubes were quicker, smaller and more easily replaced 
than the electromechanical switches in the Mark I.  The 701 executed 17,000 instructions per second and was 
used primarily for government and research work.  Vacuum tubes rapidly moved computers into business 
applications such as billing, payroll and inventory control (IBM, 2015).  By 1959, transistors were replacing 
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vacuum tubes.  The IBM 7090, one of the first fully transistorized mainframes, could perform 229,000 
calculations per second.  The U.S. Air Force used the 7090 to run its Ballistic Missile Early Warning System.  
IBM led data processing in a new direction with the 1957 delivery of the IBM 305 Random Access Method 
of Accounting and Control (RAMAC), the first computer disk storage system.  Such machines became the 
industry's basic storage medium for transaction processing.  In less than a second, the RAMAC's "random 
access" arm could retrieve data stored on any of the 50 spinning disks.  Also in 1957, IBM introduced 
FORTRAN (FORmula TRANSlation), a computer language based on algebra, grammar and syntax rules.  It 
became one of the most widely used computer languages for technical work (IBM, 2015).  
Just as his father saw the company's future in tabulators rather than scales and clocks, Thomas J. 
Watson, Jr., foresaw the role computers would play in business, and he led IBM's transformation from a 
medium-sized maker of tabulating equipment and typewriters into a computer industry leader (IBM, 2015). 
The 1960’s began with IBM employees passing 100,000 people. During this period, IBM made and 
sold massive computers to large governments and corporations.  IBM's computers helped businesses both 
manage and produce massive amounts of data, thereby assuring that ever more powerful machines would be 
needed to keep up with both sides of the information problem (Madrigal, 2011).  On April 7, 1964, IBM 
introduced the System/360, the first large "family" of computers to use interchangeable software and 
peripheral equipment. It was a bold departure from the monolithic, one-size-fits-all mainframe.  The 
System/360 offered a choice of five processors and 19 combinations of power, speed and memory.  A user 
could operate the same magnetic tape and disk products as another user with a processor 100 times more 
powerful.  The System/360 also offered dramatic performance gains, thanks to Solid Logic Technology - 
half-inch ceramic modules containing circuitry far denser, faster and more reliable than earlier transistors.  
In 1969, IBM changed the way it sold technology.  Rather than offer hardware, services and software 
exclusively in packages, marketers "unbundled" the components and offered them for sale individually.  
Unbundling gave birth to the multibillion-dollar software and services industries (IBM, 2015). 
In the 1970’s, the computer industry expanded and wove its way into everyday life.  IBM introduced 
the floppy disk in 1971, and quickly became the standard for storing personal computer data.  When people 
shopped for groceries, IBM's supermarket checkout station, introduced in 1973, used glass prisms, lenses and 
a laser to read product prices.  Also in 1973, bank customers began making withdrawals, transfers and other 
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account inquiries via the IBM 3614 Consumer Transaction Facility, an early form of today's Automatic Teller 
Machines (IBM, 2015). 
The appointment of John R. Opel as CEO in 1981 coincided with the beginning of a new era in 
computing.  Thanks to the birth of the IBM Personal Computer or PC, the IBM brand began to enter homes, 
small business and schools.  Though not a spectacular machine by technological standards, the IBM PC 
brought together all of the most desirable features of a computer into one small machine.  It offered 16 
kilobytes of user memory (expandable to 256 kilobytes), one or two floppy disks and an optional color 
monitor.  When designing the PC, IBM for the first time contracted the production of its components to 
outside companies.  The processor chip came from Intel (IBM, 2015).  It was in July 1980, that Microsoft's 
Bill Gates agreed to create an operating system called DOS (Disk Operating System) for IBM's new computer 
for the home consumer.  IBM had now stepped into the home consumer market, sparking the computer 
revolution (Madrigal, 2011). 
John F. Akers became CEO in 1985 and focused on streamlining operations and redeploying 
resources.  During Akers' tenure, IBM's significant investment in research achieved breakthroughs in 
mathematics, memory storage and telecommunications, and made great strides in expanding computing 
capabilities.  The IBM token-ring local area network, introduced in 1985, permitted personal computer users 
to exchange information and share printers and files within a building or complex.  With the further 
development of the computer, IBM laid a foundation for network computing and numerous other applications 
(IBM, 2015). 
 
2.2  IBM’s Downward Slide 
 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, IBM was thrown into turmoil by back-to-back revolutions.  
The PC revolution placed computers directly in the hands of millions of people. And then, the client/server 
revolution sought to link all of those PCs (the "clients") with larger computers that labored in the background 
(the "servers" that served data and applications to client machines). 
Both revolutions transformed the way customers viewed, used and bought technology. And both 
fundamentally rocked IBM.  Businesses' purchasing decisions were put in the hands of individuals and 
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departments - not the places where IBM had long-standing customer relationships.  Piece-part technologies 
took precedence over integrated solutions.  The focus was on the desktop and personal productivity, not on 
business applications across the enterprise (IBM, 2015).  
IBM went from employing over 400,000 employees in 1986 to slightly more than 200,000 
employees in 1994.  Prior to this point, IBM had avoided layoffs for more than 70 years.  This was in direct 
contradiction to IBM’s philosophy of promoting lifetime employment and IBM’s stock price fell to the lowest 
it had been since 1983 (Harreld et. al., 2006).   
In 1990, IBM sales were five times their nearest rival, but growth had slowed to less than six percent.  
By 1993, the company's annual net losses reached a record $8 billion. Cost management and streamlining 
became a chief concern (IBM, 2015). And IBM seriously considered splitting its divisions into separate 
independent businesses as the company executives started to comprehend how drastically IBM was sinking. 
The existing culture at IBM failed to accurately sense changes in their competitive environment and 
failed to act on opportunities and threats.  The culture and hierarchy at IBM from senior management on up, 
interfered with IBM’s ability to grow and survive.  IBM’s cultural impediments coupled with dated core 
competencies became less valuable as competitors replicated them and the markets shifted.  IBM became 
unable to reconfigure its assets and competencies to address changing market circumstances.  Even John 
Akers claimed that “Everyone is too comfortable at a time when the business is in crisis”.  Other analysts at 
the time described IBM’s position as a “dangerous mix of arrogance and complacency” (Harreld et. al., 2006).   
On January 26, 1993, in the face of looming disaster, CEO John Akers resigned.  In addition, many 
of Akers’ direct reports also announced their departures from IBM soon after he resigned (Harreld et. al., 
2006). 
 
2.3  Enter Louis Gerstner 
 
On April 1, 1993, Louis V. Gerstner, Jr. became the first IBM CEO from “outside” the company.  
Prior to joining IBM, Gerstner had been chairman and CEO of RJR Nabisco for four years; a top executive 
at American Express for eleven years; and a successful management consultant at McKinsey & Co. (IBM, 
2015).   
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After several months on the job, Gerstner’s diagnosis of the company’s problem was clear:  Costs 
were out of line, they had lost touch with customers, the firm was too decentralized, and they had stayed with 
their old strategy too long.  He stated, “We don’t move fast enough in this company.  This is an industry in 
which success goes to the swift more than the smart.  We’ve got to become more nimble, entrepreneurial, 
focused, cost driven….we’ve been too bureaucratic and preoccupied with our own view of the world…” 
(Harreld et. al., 2006).  Gerstner knew that the company didn’t lack for smart, talented people.  They had file 
drawers full of winning strategies.  Yet, the company was frozen in place.  It needed a strategic and cultural 
change, a focus on “can-do” attitudes regarding solutions and actions (Gerstner, 2002).   
Gerstner recognized that the market was shifting beyond IBM’s core competencies.  The application 
of technology, not its invention, would become the growth engine for IBM.  This was a completely different 
approach than the old IBM business model.  In analyzing why IBM found itself failing, he noted that “What 
happened to this company was not an act of God, some mysterious biblical plague sent down from on high.  
It’s simple.  People took our business away.”  Gerstner’s insights led to a transformation that subsequently 
led IBM to exit the network hardware business, application software, storage and personal computers and to 
enter the services businesses and develop a freestanding software business (Harreld et. al., 2006). 
After stabilizing the company in the mid-1990s, Gerstner described IBM’s bet on the future this 
way:  “Our bet was this:  Over the next decade, customers would increasingly value companies that could 
provide solutions – solutions that integrated technology from various suppliers and, more importantly, 
integrated technology into the process of the enterprise…In services, you don’t make a product and sell it.  
You sell a capability…this is the kind of capability you cannot acquire.”  (Harreld et. al., 2006).  
In September of 1999, Gerstner was reading a monthly report that indicated that current financial 
pressures had forced a business unit to discontinue funding of a promising new initiative.  Gerstner was 
incensed and demanded to know “Why do we consistently miss the emergence of new industries?”  
Underscoring this question were the results of a study by the IBM strategy group documenting how the 
company had failed to capture value from 29 separate technologies and businesses that the company had 
developed but failed to commercialize.  For example, IBM developed the first commercial router but Cisco 
dominated the market.  As early as 1996, IBM had developed technologies to accelerate the performance of 
the web, but Akamai, a second-mover, had the product vision to capture the market.  In another example, 
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IBM developed speech recognition software but their initiative was eclipsed by Nuance.  In each instance, 
the conclusion was that IBM had the potential to win these markets but had failed to take advantage of the 
opportunity.  The question was “why” this happened (O’Reilly et. al., 2009). 
A detailed internal analysis of why the company missed these markets revealed six major reasons 
IBM routinely missed new technology and market opportunities.  These included: 
1) A management system that rewarded execution directed at short-term results and did not value 
strategic business building.  The dominant leadership style rewarded within the company was 
to execute flawlessly, not to pioneer into new area. 
2) The company preoccupation with current served markets and existing offerings.  This made 
IBM slow to recognize disruptive technologies and to recognize new markets. 
3) A business model that emphasized sustained profit rather than actions oriented towards higher 
price/earnings.  The emphasis was geared toward improving profitability of a stable portfolio 
rather than accelerating innovation.  The unrealistic expectation was that new businesses needed 
to break even within a year or two. 
4) An inadequate approach to gathering and using market insight for embryonic markets.  The 
insistence on “fact-based financial analysis” hindered IBM’s ability to generate market 
intelligence for new and ambiguous markets.   
5) Lack of discipline for selecting, experimenting, funding, and terminating new growth 
businesses.  Even when new growth business opportunities were identified, IBM’s existing 
management systems failed to provide funding or restrict its ability to develop creative new 
businesses.  Worse, the company applied its mature business process to growth opportunities 
with the result that it often starved these new ventures. 
6) Lack of entrepreneurial leadership skills for designing new business models and building 
growth businesses.  It also lacked the patience and persistence that new start-ups require 
(O’Reilly et. al., 2009). 
The first three root causes were contradictory to much of IBM’s success in mature markets – the 
intense focus on short-term results, careful attention to major customers and markets, and an emphasis on 
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improving profitability.  These all contributed to the firm’s ability to exploit mature markets – and made it 
difficult to explore new spaces.   
As a result of this analysis and the discussions it generated among senior management, a series of 
recommendations were made to permit the company to succeed at both exploitation in mature markets and 
exploration in growth areas.  These decisions resulted in the development of the Emerging Business 
Organization initiative in 2000 (O’Reilly et. al., 2009). 
 
2.4  Emerging Business Opportunities 
 
The Emerging Business Opportunities (EBOs) team was formed to explicitly address IBM’s chronic 
failure to rapidly and successfully pursue new market opportunities.  A foundational insight of the team was 
the recognition that the company’s portfolio of businesses could be divided into three horizons:  current core 
businesses; growth businesses; and future growth businesses – with each type of business having unique 
challenges and requiring a different organizational architecture (O’Reilly et. al., 2009).  
Emerging Business Opportunities (EBOs) developed an integrated set of processes, incentives and 
structures designed explicitly to enable IBM to address new business opportunities.  An EBO focuses on 
“white space” opportunities that can become profitable, billion-dollar businesses within five to seven years 
(Wong, 2008). The EBO process begins with the recognition that mature, well-established businesses need 
to operate differently from new, exploratory ones.  To succeed, emerging businesses have different key 
success factors and require a different style of leadership and different alignments of people, formal 
organizations and culture.  IBM recognized that the current management system that rewarded short-term 
execution aimed at current markets did not apply to EBOs.  Trying to operate new business with the same 
business model typically results with the new business being terminated. Further, the company lacked the 
discipline for selecting, experimenting, funding and terminating new businesses for the proper reasons.  This 
led to the development of a process to identify new growth opportunities and to establish separate 
organizations with their own leadership, alignment, and funding – all with senior management oversight to 
ensure that the new businesses got the resources needed to explore the opportunity.  Under the new system, 
it was made crystal clear that EBOs are not product upgrades or just technical opportunities; they’re business 
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opportunities – ones that can be commercialized and turned into revenue-producing businesses (Harreld et. 
al., 2006).   
IBM’s EBO program can be viewed as a group of startup companies being developed and nurtured 
inside the management constructs of the industry’s largest information technology company (Nunes, 2004).  
The EBO program is intrapreneurship and the IBM intrapreneurship model is adapted from The Alchemy of 
Growth (Baghai,et. al. 2000).  The model distinguishes new ventures from established businesses on three 
levels defined as Horizon 1 (H1), Horizon 2 (H2), and Horizon 3 (H3) businesses.  H1 businesses are mature 
and managed with a focus on current revenue and profit.  The H1 businesses are the “cash cows” which return 
the bulk of profits and cash flows (Wilkens, 2005).  H2 businesses have a longer time frame and are more 
uncertain.  Milestones are based on revenue growth and market share gains.   
The EBO process begins when growth opportunities are identified that require significant cross-
organization integration to be successful (Harreld et. al., 2006).  Gerstner announced the appointment of John 
Thompson, then head of the software group, as Vice Chairman and head of the new EBO initiative.  
Thompson was a 34-year veteran of the company and was widely respected for his skills as an operating 
manager and strategist.(O’Reilly et. al., 2009).  Thompson developed and EBO management and funding 
process for cross-company alignment.  Each emerging business opportunity had to meet the following 
criteria: 
• Strategic Alignment with the IBM corporate strategy 
• Cross-IBM Leverage – focus on generating new businesses that cut across the IBM 
organization. 
• New Source of Customer Value – ideas that allow the company to move into new domains and 
test new business models are preferred over better understood models 
• $1 Billion Plus Revenue Potential – Potential of growing into a billion dollar market within 
three to five years. 
• Market Leadership – New business ideas must also provide the opportunity for IBM to emerge 
as the market leader. 
• Sustained Profit – Have a good chance for the business to sustain profitability (O’Reilly et. al., 
2009). 
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To identify new emerging business opportunities, IBM developed a semi-annual process in which 
ideas are solicited from both within the company and outside the company.  This effort typically results in 
more than 150 ideas.  These ideas are reviewed and down-selected to the top 20 or so then small teams are 
formed to perform more detailed strategic analysis.  After the analysis, the ideas are socialized among senior 
executives and customers to determine acceptance.  If an idea is deemed to have merit, the strategy group 
then performs a “deep dive” to properly vet the market opportunity with the goal of building new billion 
dollar businesses.  Establishing a new EBO links new business venture ideas to real customer benefits.  Of 
the 150 ideas generated each year, only a few are chosen as new EBOs (O’Reilly et. al., 2009). 
Once an EBO is formed, the corporate strategy group acts as the agent and partner for the EBO.  
They meet monthly to review progress, refine strategy, and help them get the right people and alignment to 
ensure execution.  The key principles established for the success of an EBO are: 
• Active and Frequent Senior-Level Sponsorship – lack of senior management attention to new 
ventures was a lessons learned in the strategy group of IBM’s failures to enter new businesses 
in the past. 
• Dedicated “A-Team” Leadership – Very experienced leaders are assigned since historically 
IBM’s younger managers often lacked the networks needed to nurture and embryonic business 
within the larger company 
• Disciplined Mechanisms for Cross-Company Alignment – Ensure that the line businesses 
provide the requisite support, even when it may run counter to their short-term interests. 
• Resources Fenced – and Monitored – to Avoid Premature Cuts – EBOs are funded through their 
line of business, but the process is carefully monitored to make sure that the new business 
receives its full funding. 
• Actions Linked to Critical Milestones – Carefully define and monitor progress in meeting 
milestones.  Businesses are measured against these milestones and not the financial merits of 
their line of business.  This protects embryonic ventures from being terminated too early for a 
failure to achieve mature business targets. 
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• Quick Start, Quick Stop – If the new business doesn’t meet its milestones and connect with 
customers, it needs to be stopped or morphed into something else.  The intent is to get into the 
market quickly, learn from it, and adjust accordingly or stop the effort (O’Reilly et. al., 2009). 
From 1999 to 2005, 18 opportunities were identified, including autonomic computing, blade servers, 
digital media and network processing.  Some of these succeeded and were subsequently folded into existing 
businesses while others failed (Harreld et. al., 2006).  Between 2000 and 2005, EBOs added $15.2B to IBM’s 
top line.  While acquisitions over this period added 9 percent to IBM’s top line, EBOs added 19 percent.  
This process has enabled the company to explore and exploit – to both enter new businesses and to remain 
competitive in mature ones (O’Reilly et. al., 2009). 
 
2.5  IBM’s Emerging Business Opportunities Success 
 
In 2000, an EBO for a new Life Sciences business started since market studies suggested that there 
were significant scientific and market opportunities in applying high-performance computing and 
information technology to the emerging areas of biotechnology and personalized medicine even though and 
earlier IBM effort had recently failed.  The opportunity as to help customers in academia, government, 
pharmaceuticals, and hospitals integrate the massive amounts of information being generated.  To succeed, 
IBM would have to help these customers develop integrated solutions, not sell existing products.  This 
required both though leadership and integration across four major IBM silos (O’Reilly et. al., 2009). 
Between April 2000 and November 2006, the Life Sciences business grew to a $5 billion business 
with hundreds of PhDs in life sciences (O’Reilly et. al., 2009).   
Although the market opportunity in Life Sciences was recognized in 1998, several early attempts to 
enter this market failed.  Funding from the lines of business wasn’t forthcoming, there was a lack of 
entrepreneurial leadership, and the IBM processes and metrics that helped mature businesses actively worked 
against the establishment of the new venture.  It was only with the development of the EBO process that these 
barriers were removed.  The combination of a clear strategic intent, guaranteed funding, senior-level 
sponsorship, entrepreneurial leaders, and an aligned organization were required for the venture to succeed 
(O’Reilly et. al., 2009). 
15 
Without the senior-level support and typical internal oppositions encountered, many entrepreneurial 
leaders may quit and take their ideas elsewhere.  The same issues have led some firms to isolate their new 
ventures.  However, upon reflection, this approach fails to leverage the capabilities and resources of the larger 
company.  It ignores the critical issues of integration, sharing and leveraging of resources and fails to infuse 
entrepreneurial leadership into the larger company (O’Reilly et. al., 2009). 
 
2.6  Lessons Learned IBM’s EBO Successes 
 
Louis Gerstner stated that early on in his career he discovered, to his dismay that the open exchange 
of ideas in that absence of hierarchy doesn’t work so easily in a large, hierarchical-based organization.  He 
began a lifelong process of trying to build organizations that allow for hierarchy but at the same time bring 
people together for problem solving, regardless of where they are positioned within the organization 
(Gerstner, 2002). 
When Gerstner entered IBM, he was not technical by any means.  He knew that he would have to 
learn IBM’s technology but he made no attempts to master it.  He relied on his unit leaders to be the translators 
into business terms that he understood and excelled at.  Gerstner also is not a fan of hierarchy.  His solutions 
were to find the problem solvers, regardless of position and reduce committees and meetings.  He removed 
committee decision making and encouraged candid communications.  After joining IBM, Gerstner quickly 
surmised that most, if not all, of the business processes were expensive and inefficient.  Therefore change 
was needed.  Michael Hammer, coauthor of “Reengineering the Corporation” told the New York Times”  
“Gerstner decided that sooner is better than perfect – that was the anathema to the old OBM.  This is the most 
important kind of change that can come from the top.” (Gerstner, 2002). 
Gerstner acknowledged that it would have been “absolutely naïve – as well as dangerous” if he had 
come into a company as complex as IBM with a plan to import a “band of outsiders” to somehow magically 
run the company better than the people who were there in the first place and had talent and unique expertise 
(Gerstner, 2002).   
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Gerstner also knew from past experiences that intense rivalries between units of a large company 
were a prevalent behavior pattern.  The units that had been the traditional base of a company more often than 
not resisted the emergence of a new sibling, even homegrown (Gerstner, 2002). 
EBO successes were due in part to IBM’s culture.  Gerstner stated that, “I came to see, in my time 
at IBM, that culture isn’t just one aspect of the game – it is the game.”  In the end, an organization is nothing 
more than the collective capacity of its people to create value.   
 
2.7  Comparison to Other Recent Successes 
 
Similar to IBM, Nokia and Shell have thriving corporate ventures for developing new business 
within their large established firms (Shah et. al, 2008).  
Shell, an integrated oil and gas company, is involved with venturing through its GameChanger (GC) 
program.  GC was started in 1996 with a team of twelve dedicated technical and scientific experts that have 
the potential to drastically impact the future of energy.  This program combines the support from Shell with 
“the freedom to make their own decisions”.  One such idea that flourished into massive returns in from 
Barend Pek, a Dutch engineer and expert at turning natural gas, the cleanest-burning fossil fuel, into liquid.  
Advanced technology cools the gas to -260° F, condensing its volume 600 times for easy shipment overseas.  
He is part of a team of pioneering engineers who have received support to develop the innovative idea of 
liquefying gas at sea, in extreme conditions and away from existing infrastructure over the last decade (Shell, 
N.D.). 
Nokia is the world’s largest manufacturer of mobile telephones.  Venturing at Nokia was triggered 
to find new avenues of growth.  Several teams are active within Nokia under the broad umbrella of Nokia 
Venture Organization (NVO) which was founded in 1998.  The overall aim of these venturing teams is to 
identify and develop new business opportunities that fall outside Nokia’s current focus but are within the 
scope of Nokia’s strategic agenda (Shah et. al, 2008).   
New growth opportunities funded by NVO include new wireless services such as accessing office 
data from mobile phones; playing music and video over wireless devices; and mobile games and 
entertainment as well as enhancing network capabilities have been very prosperous for NVO (Oakes, 2003). 
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IBM, Shell and Nokia all have seven commonalities among their corporate venturing: 
1. Analyze Necessity  
2. Define Objectives and Deliverables 
3. Involve a Visionary Senior Executive 
4. Commit Resources:  Funds, Managers and Organizational Home 
5. Develop a Disciplined Governing Mechanism 
6. Define the Project Transfer Process 
7. Identify and Attract the Right People (Shah et. al, 2008) 
 
  
18 
CHAPTER 3:  INTRAPRENEURSHIP – LEARNING FROM PAST FAILURES 
 
The following example of a failed new venture by Boeing illustrates the importance of 
intrapreneurship free of traditional corporate policies.  
In 1964, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) was created to manage and 
oversee all commuter operations in and around the greater Boston region, making the MBTA one of the 
busiest commuter systems in the country (American-rails.com, 2011).  The MBTA was also formed to take 
advantage of the newly passed federal aid legislation.  The MBTA's replacement for the PCC cars, dubbed 
the "Type 6", entered the design stages in 1969 and was initially designed to be a high performance version 
of the PCC car.  A wooden mock-up of the proposed car appeared in early 1970 which included air 
conditioning.  
Around the same time the MBTA was designing their railcars, the San Francisco Municipal Railway 
(MUNI) had hired Louis T. Klauder and Associates to design a new type of car to replace their PCC fleet.  
Klauder’s design was also a high performance version of the MUNI PCC railcar it was replacing.   
In 1971, MUNI put out a contract proposal for 78 cars, expecting the price per car to be in the 
$300,000 to $350,000 range. However, the bids received were from $500,000 to $700,000 per car. MUNI 
rejected the bids and set out to redesign their cars and eliminate any costly and unnecessary parts of the 
design. 
The UMTA became concerned with the high costs of the MUNI car design and the consideration 
that the MBTA was looking for a fast solution to one of its more troublesome railroad lines (the Green Line), 
and was looking at importing a Düwag car from Europe. The UMTA, in an effort to promote standardized 
equipment at a reasonable price for San Francisco, Boston, and any other city that may be interested in new 
cars, created the Boston - San Francisco (BSF) Committee in early 1972. The BSF Committee provided 
oversight by taking MUNI’s original design and making it compatible for both the MUNI and MBTA 
systems. This involved a number of design compromises with the purpose of saving money.   
Other cities expressed varying degrees of interest in the program initially, namely Philadelphia, 
Pittsburgh, Newark, Cleveland, and El Paso, Texas, Mexico City and Toronto.  Although all of them would 
eventually drop out leaving the MBTA and MUNI to design their own car. 
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The BSF Committee finally completed the design of the "United States Standard Light Rail Vehicle" 
(LRV) with sufficient concessions on both sides so that the car would function in both cities.  However, the 
resulting design did not totally please either city (Moore, 1998). 
 
3.1  Boeing-Vertol’s Mass Transit New Venture 
 
In the early 1970s, with the Vietnam War coming to a close, government defense budget cuts, and 
the United States in a recession, Boeing carried out major internal restructuring by eliminating some divisions 
and creating others.  The result was the formation of three largely autonomous companies: Boeing 
Commercial Airplane, Boeing Aerospace, and Boeing-Vertol for helicopters.  Its Commercial Airplane 
Division remained the largest in the company (Pike, 2011).   
In addition to restructuring, Boeing attempted diversification from traditional government and 
defense contracts with the hopes of keeping prosperous profit margins and steady work for its employees.  
The goal of diversification was to add less cyclic - or counter-cyclic programs to Boeing’s main product line 
or airplanes.  The enthusiasm for new ventures reached a crescendo in the operating units of Boeing when 
the Office of Corporate Business Development (OCBD) was formed to aid in focusing these efforts. 
The OCBD was a small think tank headed by Henry K. “Bud” Hebeler with a staff of eleven and 
had a two-pronged charter.  The charter included the development of a ten-year business plan which was 
updated annually for presentation to the Executive Council.  The second part of the charter was to make 
independent assessments of the projects being developed by the operating divisions.  Incredibly, this was the 
first time in the company’s history that such a plan had been instituted.  
The most significant projects in the diversification wave included light rail transportation, small 
automated people movers, commercial hydrofoils, energy systems, urban planning, service industries, waste 
water purification, desalination systems and property development (Bauer, 1990). 
The light rail new venture was championed by the Boeing-Vertol Division in 1973 and was awarded 
the contract to build a standardized light rail vehicle for $63 million.  MUNI and the MBTA ordered 80 cars 
and 150 cars respectively. The orders were later expanded to 100 and 175 respectively. The Southeast 
Pennsylvania Transit Authority (SEPTA) and the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority  (GCRTA) 
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came close to ordering the cars from Boeing but backed out at the last moment and bought their new cars 
elsewhere (Mack, 2011). 
David Phelps, manager of rail programs for the American Public Transit Association in Washington, 
D.C. said that Boeing was chosen for the job because it was the lowest bidder that met the necessary 
qualifications.  General Electric Company was the highest bidder at $99 million (Sullivan, 1998).   
The UMTA, through the BSF Committee’s railcar design standardization was a major cause of 
problems to Boeing-Vertol.  The compromised design coupled with Boeing-Vertol’s rail system inexperience 
led to a myriad of problems.  These problems cost Boeing-Vertol, MUNI and the MBTA millions of dollars 
along with premature retirement of the vehicles. 
At first, the rail cars earned high marks from riders in Boston for smoother, quieter, more 
comfortable rides with fewer “screeches” on curves.  But rampant design flaws brought nothing but dismay 
to transit officials as the new LRV's were problematic from their very first days. They suffered from 
derailments on tight curves, electrical shorts, failure of the car's motors, and multiple issues with the 
complicated door system.  Because of these failures, the MBTA typically had less than 50% of the fleet 
available for the first few years of service and MUNI did not have their full fleet operational until 1982, 
which was nine years after contract award.  The multitude of continuing problems resulted in the Boeing-
Vertol cars having a very poor mean time between failures (MTBF) (Mack, 2011).  At first, the MTBF was 
a very unsatisfactory 600 miles but improved to between 1800 – 2000 miles in 1982.  This was still considered 
very poor when compared to the German-built railcars in San Diego which had a MTBF of 28,300 miles 
(Sullivan, 1998). 
The continuous malfunctions soon escalated to a major political and public relations nightmare as 
the rail car problems became more apparent to the MBTA and more importantly, the general public. The 
MBTA was still accepting new cars from Boeing-Vertol, but the cars were falling out of service faster than 
the MBTA's maintenance staff could repair them. The rail cars proved so technologically complex that they 
were impossible for the MBTA to maintain (Rodgers, 1996).  Additionally, the MBTA could not acquire 
replacement parts fast enough to repair the disabled LRVs. 
 In an effort to keep as many LRVs operating as possible, MBTA maintenance crews began 
cannibalizing some of the disabled cars for replacement parts and instituting a PCC rebuilding program to 
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augment the LRV fleet.  The MBTA also forced Boeing-Vertol to make as many as 70 – 80 modifications to 
the rail cars each year.  Transit officials said that the rail cars just couldn’t hold up under the daily wear of 
transporting thousands of commuters (Sullivan, 1998). 
The MBTA’s Green Line, named because it goes through an area called the Emerald Necklace of 
Boston (Gaffin, 2003) was famous for being the most heavily used light rail line in the country but also 
became the focal point of a major newspaper story.  A reporter and a photographer managed to get into a 
section of the Green Line's subway which was not in use at the time and found it full of cannibalized cars 
which had been abandoned in the tunnel. They were in the tunnel to help prevent the riding public from 
seeing the sheer number of brand-new, but heavily cannibalized LRVs.  The MBTA had been towing the 
cars into the subway during the middle of the night when the subway was closed to the public. The story and 
photographs brought the problems with the LRV into the public eye for the first time.  After the story broke, 
out of service LRVs began to appear in several storage yards which were easily viewed by the public, though 
this may have simply been due to the ever-increasing number of disabled cars (Lampariello, 2011). 
As the public on the east coast became increasingly aware of the ongoing LRV problems, MUNI 
was experiencing unique west coast problems caused by the standardized design.  The San Francisco cars 
needed stairways for ground-level boarding on the surface parts of their rail lines but also needed the stairs 
stowed to convert for high-platform operation in the subway underground.  This became a passenger flow 
problem in San Francisco. MUNI could only use the two center doors on the LRVs in the subway.  The front 
end of the railcars curved away from the platforms resulting in an excessive, unsafe gap which prevented 
passengers from safely boarding or exiting the cars. Having doors that could not be used underground caused 
major passenger congestion and inconvenience (Dilger, 2008).  This was another design compromise as the 
narrow front end was required by Boston so that the LRV could navigate the tight curves in their 1897-
vintage subway as shown in Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1.  Boeing-Vertol LRV with Rounded Corners and Doors 
 
 
 
In addition, MUNI passengers experienced brakes sticking and rusting thin metal roofs that leaked.  
Passengers sweltered on hot days since the MUNI cars were not air conditioned and worst of all, the rail cars 
wheels worked loose.  “They are scrap”, MUNI spokeswoman Maggie Lynch said of the cars that cost 
millions in renovation and repairs.  Unlike the cable cars, few people will look back fondly on Boeing’s 
LRVs, which were troublesome since they were new and a continuous nuisance in the mid-1990s as public 
confidence bottomed out (Leichuk, 2002). 
 
3.2  Boeing-Vertol’s Mass Transit New Venture Failure 
 
By 1979, after becoming increasingly frustrated with the ongoing failures of the LRVs, the MBTA 
successfully sued Boeing-Vertol for financial damages, the cost of repairs and modifications to several cars.  
The MBTA also negotiated the ability to reject the last 40 cars of their order.  
What led to the Boeing Vertol Mass Transit New Venture failure?  The main reason, I believe, was 
the lack of leadership that understood the details and relationships of light rail cars and mass transit.  Other 
factors included improper planning to diversify into unfamiliar markets from core competencies to overcome 
economic pressures; ignoring historical lessons of previous mass transit designs and lessons learned; using 
unproven technology; and a lack of commitment to thoroughly test each subsystem.   I also believe that there 
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was a certain level of arrogance and narrow-mindedness in believing that aerospace policies and procedures 
trump true understanding of different technology’s requirements and specifications.  
Before attempting this new venture, Boeing Vertol would have been better prepared to succeed had 
they analyzed the following: 
• The economics of light rail vehicles and other transit systems 
• Practical means of achieving mass transit capacity requirements 
• Elements of safe design 
• Failure modes and effects in light rail vehicles 
• Integration of  mean times to failure into a model of system dependability 
• Specific criteria for light rail vehicle system components 
• The dynamics that affect the design, size and layout of vehicles  
• A disciplined process and continuous commitment to weight and cost control  
• Trade studies between proven vs. new components and designs  
• Commercially realistic performance specifications  
• A commitment to careful system optimization  
• Willingness to support experiments that clarify uncertainties 
• A willingness to “break the paradigm” of existing project culture 
• Engineering and designer training for a new venture (Anderson, 1996)  
The six most prominent factors that lead to Boeing-Vertol’s mass transit failure, in order of 
importance were: 
1. Lack of leadership that understood Mass Transit 
2. Lack of specific criteria for design of light rail vehicle system components 
3. Unrealistic performance specifications 
4. Ignorance to the elements of safe mass transit design 
5. A weak and undisciplined commitment to weight and cost control 
6. Failure to understand the failure modes and effects in light rail vehicles 
During Boeing-Vertol’s Mass Transit New Venture period, Thornton “T” Arnold Wilson was the 
company President, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board.  Wilson, as well as Boeing, was 
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world renowned for aerospace and aeronautic expertise but Wilson also had an intuitive feel for his 
company’s larger interests.  He never liked diversifying if it meant moving the company onto ground it knew 
less well or not at all.  Wilson knew that the leadership before him did not understand the intricacies and 
dynamics of mass transit and that Boeing had no business in this new venture.  However, the economic 
despair at Boeing in particular and the United States in general during the years immediately following the 
Vietnam War, left the Boeing executives before Wilson with seemingly little alternative than to venture into 
commercial and alternative ventures (Boeing, 2011).     
Robert R. Kiley, who was the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the MBTA recalled his 
encounter with “T” Wilson in 1975.  “I was alone in my office in Boston, and a guard downstairs called to 
say that a man named Wilson was there and wanted to see me.  When I discovered it was T. Wilson, Boeing’s 
CEO, I went down and brought him to my office.  He was upset about what happened, noting how sorry he 
was not to have stopped this move by Boeing into a technology it knew nothing about.  He made clear his 
feelings that Boeing should not stray from the business it knew.  He said, “Mr. Kiley, my only interest is 
preserving my company’s good name.  I’ll do whatever you want us to do”.  He offered, in effect, to fix the 
trains or, failing that, repay the MBTA’s investment – about $45 million in mid 1970s dollars”. (Newhouse, 
2007).  The lack of leadership that understood mass transit proved to be a very costly venture for Boeing-
Vertol.   
Had Boeing-Vertol been more experienced in mass transit, they might have recognized the 
ambiguity and unrealistic performance specifications levied from the UMTA.  In an attempt to standardize 
light rail cars, the UMTA tried to reduce cost through a joint procurement and to develop a standard light rail 
vehicle that could be used by multiple cities.   This standardization attempt by the UMTA actually caused 
ambiguity and a lack of specific design criteria for the LRV system components.  The UMTA’s attempted 
merger of two specific sets of requirements from different needs resulted in more complex and unrealistic 
design requirements.  The UMTA’s compromised design proved to be Boeing-Vertol and the rail cars’ major 
drawbacks, as subsystem after subsystem produced headache after headache (Vantuono, 1996).   
Not having past experience in previous mass transit design and specifications, Boeing relied on its 
core-competencies and used past aerospace and aeronautics engineering practices to design the LRVs to the 
best of their in-house capabilities.  The railcar doors were designed and manufactured out of materials that 
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could withstand the stresses of supersonic flight but could not withstand the kicks of passengers (Green 
Dividend, n.d.).  State Rep. Lincoln P. Cole Jr., Vice Chairman of the MBTA's advisory board, said "Boeing 
was not in the trolley car business originally, so it's not surprising that their first try wasn't that good. I heard 
the doors in those cars have 4000 moving parts; you have to figure something will go wrong" (Wiltshire, 
1979).   The doors actually had 1300 parts but would not close properly and would give false signals that 
interrupted operations.  The door design was based on Boeing’s previous aeronautic and aerospace experience 
where a plug door is designed to seal itself by taking advantage of pressure difference on its two sides which 
is typical on pressurized aircraft. The higher pressure on one side forces the wedge-shaped door into its 
socket, making a good seal and preventing it from being opened until the pressure is released.  These types 
of doors, however, are usually limited to vehicles that make infrequent stops as the door operation is slow 
and mechanically complex.  Figure 2 below shows an improved design of the plug type door that did not 
recycle when it is accidentally closed on someone or something. The wide rubber strips are soft enough that 
trapped objects can be pulled through.  Unfortunately, it was not until the 1990s when all passenger cars were 
retrofitted with more reliable bi-fold doors (Moore, 1998).   
 
Figure 2.  Boeing-Vertol's Redesigned Plug Type Door 
 
Proper Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) using mass transit requirements instead of the 
familiar defense standards could have also greatly improved the success of the New Venture.  FMEA is used 
to analyze potential reliability problems in the development cycle of the project, making it easy to take actions 
26 
to overcome reliability issues, mitigate risks and enhancing the reliability through design.  FMEA is used to 
identify actions to mitigate the analyzed potential failure modes and their effect on operations.  Anticipating 
these failure modes, by being familiar and experienced with the specifics within the mass transit domain, 
needs to be carried on extensively, in order to prepare a list of maximum potential failure modes (Visitask, 
2011).  The defense industry standard of concurrency was also utilized out of mass transit inexperience.   
“Concurrency” in defense programs is the overlapping of development and production of systems 
and has long been a controversial Pentagon practice. Not surprisingly, inventing something while beginning 
to build it, particularly something as complex as a modern warship, aircraft, or combat vehicle, introduces 
the risks of schedule delays and cost overruns. At the same time, the rapid fielding of a still-to-be-perfected 
system can create or preserve an advantage on the battlefield; it’s the technological equivalent of getting there 
“the fastest with the mostest.”  While there’s no way to eliminate the risks, the Defense Department has often 
felt that the rewards of concurrency outweighed the risks.  “Concurrent development and production of 
weapons systems has been emphasized during wartime or periods of national emergency, when a consensus 
readily supported the acceleration of high-priority weapons systems.” Historical examples included depth 
charges and nuclear weapons in World War II, the Sputnik-era missile programs of the 1950s, and the 
introduction of “smart” weapons from the 1960s through the 1980s  (Donnelly, n.d.). 
As in previous high-priority defense projects, manufacturing and testing of the railcars were 
performed simultaneously instead of fully testing the railcars before delivering them to the customer and 
entering them into service.  Fully testing the railcars before delivery would have uncovered many of the 
defects that plagued the MBTA, MUNI and Boeing-Vertol.   
 
 
 
3.3  Lessons Learned from Boeing-Vertol’s Mass Transit Failure 
 
Boeing-Vertol’s mass transit new venture did not successfully “forget, borrow and learn” from 
Boeing’s core business units.  The new venture did not forget what made Boeing-Vertol successful in the 
past and establish the elementary differences between mass transit and aeronautics/aerospace.  The core 
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business assets that were borrowed were the established policies and procedures of the foundational defense 
contracts.  As such, the status quo on the range of issues from needed competencies, planning and budgeting, 
business performance assessment, metrics, etc. were not challenged and adapted to the new venture.   
In hindsight, Boeing-Vertol learned about mass transit too late.  Robert Kiley said, “Some obvious 
techniques were overlooked in this zeal for applying modern technology to streetcars…One technique that 
was overlooked…and it’s surprising that it didn’t occur to someone to go that route, is a prototype.  It wasn’t 
done, and I think it’s the most crucial mistake made in the program”.  Unlike previous rail car programs that 
took an average of six years of work before the initiation of full scale service, little research on the LRV was 
conducted.  Probably Boeing’s biggest mistake was that the company felt that it was not in their commercial 
interest to license known, proven designs.  If Boeing had used proven technology for the LRV, many of the 
car’s problems may never have existed.  As an example, the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) also received 
LRVs.  However, the CTA order differed from MUNI and the MBTA in that they specified General Electric 
camshaft controllers, which were derived from the PCC program in the early 1960s (the MUNI and MBTA 
LRVs had the new solid state “chopper” control).   The CTA cars had no major problems, indicating that the 
LRV’s problems stemmed more from the use of unproven technology, and insufficient vehicle testing, not 
Boeing’s ability to manufacture a rail vehicle (Moore, 1998).   
In fact, as of 2011, Boeing cars are still in use after more than thirty years. Among the reasons why 
the company left the subway business was that post-Vietnam War military build- up provided Boeing with 
far more lucrative military contracts. 
 
 
3.4  Comparison to Other Recent Failures 
 
A surprising comparison to Boeing-Vertol’s mass transit new venture failure can be made with 
Goldman Sachs’ recent contribution to both the US housing and financial crisis of the 2000s.   
Goldman Sachs ventured from a traditional domestic organization into an established global banking 
power by incorporating junk bonds and private equity as well as globalizing operations (Friedman, 2009).     
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Goldman Sachs leaders, in conjunction with leaders of other investment banks, successfully lobbied 
to eliminate effective limits on the amount of leverage the largest investment banks could use.  In 2004, under 
pressure from Goldman Sachs in particular, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) removed the 12 
to 1 debt to capital ratio it had previously imposed.  The SEC gave the five largest investment banks (Goldman 
Sachs, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers and Morgan Stanley) a special exemption so they could 
use their own risk models to determine their capital requirements.  In some cases the debt to capital ratio was 
as high as 40 to 1.  This new SEC deregulation enabled the investment banks to expand their businesses 
through borrowing, but left them fatally undercapitalized when they suffered losses (Ritholtz, 2009).   
Goldman Sachs contributed to both the US housing crisis and the financial crisis by selling 
subprime, mortgage-backed securities.  From 2001 to 2007, Goldman Sachs sold $135 billion of bonds 
backed by risky mortgages.  Carl Levin, the Democrat Senator chairing the Senate Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations, stated that “From 2004 to 2007, in exchange for lucrative fees, Goldman Sachs helped 
lenders like Long Beach, Fremont and New Century, securitize high risk, poor quality loans, obtain favorable 
credit ratings for the resulting residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS), and sell the RMBS securities 
to investors, pushing billions of dollars of risky mortgages into the financial system (Levin, 2010).  Within 
18 months after Goldman Sachs sold subprime securities to investors, one sixth of the mortgages underlying 
the bonds had defaulted.  Goldman Sachs subprime bonds related to the losses and foreclosures suffered in 
the financial crisis (Sloan, 2007).  This also assisted in snowballing the US housing crisis into a full-blown 
financial crisis.  By 2007, the US housing bubble had already started to deflate.  By creating packages of 
securities, Goldman Sachs allowed investors to bet on loans that had already been made.  In this way, 
Goldman Sachs contributed to a whole new wave of speculative activity that ended with the near-collapse of 
the global financial system and government bailouts of banks (Nocera, 2010). 
Goldman Sachs leaders defrauded investors and were charged as such on April 15, 2010 by the SEC.  
Leaders such as Executive Director Fabrice Tourre broke the law and committed fraud when they sold clients 
a complex investment linked to the value of home loans that was secretly designed to fail (Goldfarb, 2010). 
Comparing the Goldman Sachs fiasco to Boeing-Vertol’s mass transit new venture failure 
underscores the “forget, borrow and learn” scenario with organizational commitment and strong, ethical 
leadership.  Both Goldman Sachs and Boeing-Vertol did not challenge the status quo on the major issues of 
29 
needed competencies, reporting relationships, decision rights, planning and budgeting, business performance 
assessment, metrics, shared values, and shared assumptions about success.  Most importantly, they both did 
not embrace the differences between their new ventures and core business which resulted in financial loss 
for mismanaging their new venture and inflicted great financial loss on others.   
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CHAPTER 4:  CORPORATE INTRAPRENEURSHIP 
 
The intrapreneurship process is based on research and lessons learned from past intrapreneuring 
successes and failures.  Figure 3 illustrates the overall process. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Intrapreneurship Process 
 
 
 
Figure 4 illustrates that the intrapreneural process begins with the corporation.   
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Figure 4.  The Intrapreneuring Process Must Start with the Corporation to be Successful 
 
 
 
However, a new business venture with high growth potential rarely coexists gracefully with the most 
closely related established business unit within the core company.  The unnatural combination creates three 
specific challenges for the intrapreneurs of the new venture:   
• Forgetting 
• Borrowing 
• Learning  
The new business venture must forget some of what made the existing core business successful, 
because the new venture and the core business will always have elemental differences.  The new venture 
must borrow some of the core business assets—the greatest advantage it has over independent entrepreneurial 
start-ups. The new venture must also be prepared to learn some things from scratch.  
Forgetting, borrowing, and learning are monumental tasks. That’s why it’s crucial for a company to 
leverage the power of organizational design.  In building the new venture, corporate leadership must be 
willing to challenge the status quo on an extraordinary range of issues:  hiring, individual performance 
32 
evaluation, needed competencies, reporting relationships, decision rights, planning and budgeting, business 
performance assessment, metrics, compensation, shared values, and shared assumptions about success.   
These three challenges are present throughout the new venture’s lifespan, from launch to successful 
profitability.  And they’re present all at once, which means tackling them requires an understanding of how 
they’re related.  Forgetting and borrowing are at odds, for example, and need to be balanced.  A sole focus 
on forgetting would suggest isolation of the new venture, while a sole focus on borrowing would suggest full 
integration of the new venture.  Also, failure to forget cripples the learning effort.  If the new venture cannot 
leave behind the core company’s formula for success, it will not find its own.  To build a foundation for 
success, the new venture must forget the core company’s business model and learn its own.  The new venture 
must answer the fundamental questions that define its venture—Who are our customers? What value do we 
offer? How do we deliver that value?  These answers should be different from the core company’s established 
businesses. 
Learning is about changing behavior.  It is not enough to establish a new venture that can speak the 
lingo of the new venture but acts identical to the core company.  As Ray Stata, cofounder of Analog Devices 
stated, “I came to the conclusion long ago that limits to innovation have less to do with technology or 
creativity than organizational agility.  Inspired individuals can only do so much.  Emphasis must shift from 
ideas to execution and from leadership excellence to organizational excellence” (Govindarajan, 2005). 
Corporate new venture champions and intrapreneurs must keep the “forget, borrow, and learn” 
scenario fresh and bridge the gap between corporate executives and those with ideas for new ventures.  Most 
corporations are very reluctant to devote management attention, resources, time, or talent to rolling the dice 
on new ventures and especially tapping into their “A-teams” to run them.  Engineering Managers must also 
assist in overcoming a typical corporation’s success measures by staffing to “build an empire”, which is the 
classic measure of stature.  Staffing should come after clarity (Deutschman, 2005).   
In building a new venture, Engineering Management can champion the following: 
• Understanding the requirements of the new venture 
• Defining the customers for the new venture 
• Determining the value the new venture will provide to customers 
• Determining what sets the new venture apart from the competition 
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• Fulfilling the needed competencies for the new venture that are missing from the core business 
unit 
• Assisting in business performance assessment, planning and budgeting 
• Establishing shared values and shared values about success between the start-up team and 
corporate 
• Determining metrics 
• Assisting in changing the behavior of the new venture team from status quo 
Perhaps the greatest contributions corporations can make to new ventures are to ensure due diligence 
and adequate and appropriate research and planning before a new venture is officially formed.  This due 
diligence can include research into past intrapreneuring new venture successes and failures to learn what was 
and what was not successful.   
Each step in the intrapreneural process will be examined and described through the use of an 
example idea which focuses on a group of mid-level engineers in a large engineering based industrial 
corporation who desire to use their engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) knowledge and enter a 
new venture of sustainable and renewable energy.   
Figure 5 highlights that ideas for new ventures can only be successful after corporations have 
intrapreneural policies and procedures in place that encourage promoting intrapreneurship.   
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Figure 5.  New Venture Idea Presented by a Corporate Intrapreneur 
 
 
 
In this example, the idea is a means of providing sustainable renewable energy to rural agricultural 
districts that evolved from large defense and aerospace projects involving fuels, energy and the increasing 
demand for conservation coupled with the engineering challenges of a renewable yet sustainable energy 
program.  This idea surfaced and flourished since power systems traditionally have little energy storage 
capability.  Power systems must operate such that the aggregate output of all generators meet network 
demands as the demand changes in real time. 
Although the United States power grid generates more than 1,000 GW of electricity to meet peak 
demand, its total instantaneous storage capacity is less than 50 GW.   The traditional approach to bulk storage 
of electric power is by mechanical means such as pumped-storage hydroelectric and compressed air-turbine 
generation.  However, bulk storage has proven very expensive and usually not ideal for urban load center 
locations where storage is most effective and profitable.   
There are many technical challenges in supplementing conventional sources to supply a regional 
grid servicing distant markets.  In addition, renewables are often dispersed, remote, and intermittent.  
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However, where the cost of distributing power exceeds the cost of generation, as can occur in rural areas, 
renewables would be economical if the availability to meet demand was reliable.  In the High Plains of the 
United States, wind resources are fairly constant, but even so, the wind speed is not reliable enough to satisfy 
real-time local sales demand, unless excess capacity is installed.  Moreover, in low wind, all units operate 
less efficiently.  In areas with insufficient wind reliability or difficulty connecting to the grid, our solution 
approach is to store or find other uses for the excess power produced in high winds.  This electricity can be 
used in processes that tolerate interruptible and variable supply.  For a fully integrated system, excess wind 
can power can be used in the production of biofuels from local feedstock.  This will maintain local power 
supply reliability in periods of sparse wind and perhaps, support export or local use as fuel. 
Much organic waste is produced in agricultural areas, ranging from animal manures to straw.  
Anaerobic digestion (AD) exothermally converts such feedstock to biogas, a mixture of methane, carbon 
dioxide and other gases.  It is readily stored and conveyed like liquid or gas fossil fuels.  Turbines and internal 
combustion engines have been developed that burn this low calorie fuel to produce electricity.  Converting 
biogas to electricity can be used for both local distribution in low wind periods and also to run AD facility 
equipment such as stirrers and pumps.  When the power demand from the AD turbines is low or non-existent, 
the excess continuously produced biogas can heat temperature-sensitive digesters.  In high wind, the excess 
power and biogas can be used to clean and desiccate the biogas, and remove the CO2 fraction. 
The Intrapreneurship process from a large corporation’s new venture inception will be used to 
develop a solution to harness the wind power of the Great Plains to meet local demands and store excess 
power when peak load is less than peak energy output.  This compensates for the variable availability of wind 
electric power and limited grid transmission capacity.  The proposed solution can accomplish these goals by 
developing an integrated renewable energy technology using wind, animal and agricultural wastes to produce 
a more transportable and storage able end-product – syngas.  Syngas can also be exported using the current 
local and national pipeline and transportation infrastructures and thus avoid placing additional burdens on 
the electric grid.   
Figure 6 illustrates the corporate decision gates that are part of the intrapreneural process.  In the 
dissertation example idea, the renewable energy idea is strategically aligned with the corporation’s objectives 
(step 3) since the corporation has energy projects in its portfolio.  The renewable energy idea has the potential 
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to expand the corporation’s portfolio (step 4) by offering an integrated renewable energy solution.  The 
corporation does not currently offer any renewable energy solutions.  It is strategically possible that the 
integrated solution could result in the corporation being a market leader (step 5) with the solution’s combined 
technology.  Finally, by targeting rural electric cooperatives with the integrated renewable energy solution, 
the new venture resulting from implementing the intrapreneural idea could result in substantial sustained 
profits (step 6). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Corporate New Venture Decision Gates to Determine if the Intrapreneural Idea Aligns with 
Corporate Objectives 
 
 
 
By passing all of the corporate decision gates, the idea is acknowledged by the corporation as 
potentially viable and an analysis team is formed to study the idea in greater detail.  The formation of the 
analysis team is highlighted in Figure 7.   
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Figure 7.  Analysis Team Formed After the Idea Passed the Initial Four Corporate Decision Gates  
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CHAPTER 5: NATURAL RESOURCES FEASIBILITY STUDY 
As shown in Figure 8, after the analysis team is formed, feasibility studies will be conducted to 
investigate the variables, factors and potential benefits of an integrated renewable energy solution and 
determine if the investment of corporate resources will yield a desirable result.  The first area analyzed in 
providing sustainable renewable energy to rural agricultural districts is a feasibility study on the Great Plains 
Natural Resources. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  Feasibility Studies are Used to Investigate the Variables, Factors, and Potential Benefits of the 
Idea.  
 
 
 
The Great Plains stretches across parts of ten states – Colorado, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas and Wyoming (See Figure 9).  The Great Plains 
39 
consists of 376 counties with a land area of 533, 100 square miles, about one-fifth of the entire lower forty-
eight states but only approximately 3 percent of their population (Phelps, 2009).    
Historically, the Great Plains were divided into three zones: eastern tall grass prairie, a broad 
transitional mixed grass zone, and the western short-grass plains (See Figure 10). Today these three 
grasslands zones are now the eastern corn and soybean zone, the Plains soft and hard wheat belt, and the 
western cattle rangelands. Their 334 million annual tons of wheat, oats, barley, rye, sorghum, and corn are 
roughly 25 percent of the world's total production of these grains. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.  Map of the Great Plains (University of Nebraska, 2013).  
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Figure 10.  Great Plains Grasslands. 
 
 
 
   
(a) (b)      (c) 
Figure 11.  Great Plains Grasslands.  (a)  Short Grass.  (b)  Mixed Grass.  (c)  Tall Grass (Pieper, 2005)  
 
 
 
5.1  Wind Energy 
 
The windiest spots in the United States are off the coasts, in the mountains, and through the Great 
Plains, where a band of strong winds stretches from North Dakota to Texas.   According to the American 
Wind Energy Association (AWEA), the top ten states possessing the best wind energy are as follows (Phelps, 
2009): 
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1.  North Dakota  2.  Texas  3.  Kansas  4.  South Dakota  5.  Montana  
 6.  Nebraska  7. Wyoming  8. Oklahoma  9.   Minnesota  10. Iowa 
The top eight states are within the Great Plains.  The National Renewable Energy Laboratory 
(NREL) has published data on wind farms generating more than 20 MW and installed after 2000 (Denholme 
et. al, 2009).  Appendix A contains the tabulated wind farm data from NREL by state.   Figure 12 below 
illustrates the Great Plains Wind Farm Projects.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.  Plains (Shaded Area) Wind Farm Projects by State (Denholme et. al., 2009).   
 
 
 
Although North Dakota is recognized as having the best wind resources in the country, the North 
Dakota Department of Commerce has stated that there are many issues that need to be addressed prior to 
significant wind energy development. The single biggest constraint is the state's existing transmission grid. 
North Dakota currently exports nearly 60 percent of the power generated within the state, and it is likely that 
most wind generated electricity will also be exported. Utility experts agree that additions to the transmission 
grid will be necessary for significant generation expansion in the state, regardless of the fuel source (ND 
DOC, 2013). 
Johnathan Hladik, energy policy advocate with the Center for Rural Affairs (CFRA), said the biggest 
hurdle right now with renewable energy is getting it on the grid due to a lack of high voltage transmission 
lines.  Less than 1% of the nation’s high capacity transmission lines are located in the states with the most 
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wind-energy potential.  Historically, lines originated at one large power plant (fossil, hydroelectric or nuclear) 
and were aligned to serve one large municipal area, while smaller lines were installed in rural areas.  
Appendix A contains a list of the major Great Plains Wind Farm Projects (>50 MW). 
 
5.2  Great Plains Population 
 
The United States Census Bureau reports that the Great Plains include many counties with declining 
populations, a high percentages of population aged 65 and older, and net out-migration.  The 2007 census 
shows that 261 of the 376 Great Plains counties had fewer than 10,000 people.  34 counties had more than 
50,000 residents and 22 were above 100,000. However, 21 of the 22 counties with populations over 100,000 
were located in Colorado or Texas (Wilson, 2009).  Figure 13 shows the Great Plains population by county.             
 
 
 
 
Figure 13.  Great Plains Population by Country (Wilson, 2009).   
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5.3  Vegetative Feedstock 
Table 1 summarizes data from the United States Department of Agriculture, 2015 National 
Agriculture Statistic Service (NASS).  Appendix B through Appendix K show details for each state.  Table 
1 shows the number of farms in each Great Plains state as well as the top crops harvested and the associated 
United States ranking.  Wheat, corn and forage are the most prevalent crops harvested in the Great Plains.   
 
 
 
Table 1.  Great Plains Agriculture Data and Top Crops by Acres of Harvest (USDA, 2015). 
State No. of Farms Top Crop Acres US Rank 
North Dakotaa 30,300 Wheat 7,767,484 2 
South Dakotab 31,700 Corn 5,289,110 6 
Montanac 27,800 Wheat 5,627,463 3 
Wyomingd 11,700 Forage 1,053,646 22 
Nebraskae 49,100 Corn 9,087,851 3 
Coloradof 35,000 Wheat 2,181,967 8 
Kansasg 61,000 Wheat 9,009,535 1 
Oklahomah 79,600 Wheat 4,291,939 4 
New Mexicoi 24,700 Forage 343,032 37 
Texasj 245,500 Forage 5,069,579 1 
a See Appendix B North Dakota Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
b See Appendix C South Dakota Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
c See Appendix D Montana Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
d See Appendix E Wyoming Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
e See Appendix F Nebraska Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
f See Appendix G Colorado Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
g See Appendix H Kansas Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
h See Appendix I Oklahoma Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
i See Appendix J New Mexico Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
j See Appendix K Texas Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
 
 
 
The amount of a biomass resource that can be collected at a given time depends on several factors.  
For agricultural residues, these considerations include the type and sequence of collection operations, the 
efficiency of equipment, tillage and crop management practices, and environmental restrictions.  The latter 
include needs to limit erosion, maintain soil productivity, and maintain soil carbon levels.  Collection 
methods for agricultural residues are similar to those used in harvesting hay.  Different systems have varying 
capture efficiencies, driving the cost of collection itself to 20 to 25 percent of total delivered cost, typically 
$5 to $7/ton. 
Following grain harvest, residues such as wheat straw and crop stalks, leaves, and cobs (referred to 
as corn stover), are left in the field.  These residues could be collected and combusted to produce energy. 
44 
However, only a fraction of the waste should be harvested as the residue protects the soil from water and 
wind erosion as well as a source of nutrients/organic matter to replenish the soil.  Just above one-fifth of the 
over 100 million tons of agricultural waste annually generated in the United States are currently used.  
Although the Great Plains raises more wheat than corn, the energy generation potential is 
significantly less from wheat straw than from corn stover because wheat straw has a lower energy content. 
Moreover, fewer tons of wheat straw can be collected per acre.  Corn stover contains 5,290 Btu/lb (wet) and 
7,560 Btu/lb (dry) whereas wheat straw has 5,470 Btu/lb (wet) and 6,840 Btu/lb (dry). The delivered 
feedstock corn stover and wheat straw prices include costs of collecting and transporting the residues. The 
collected cost of corn stover ranges from $20 to $40 per ton while the cost of wheat straw is approximately 
$50 per ton. Consequently, corn stover typically costs between $1.89 to $3.78/MMBtu, and wheat straw costs 
about $4.57/MMBtu (LMCO, 2010).   
Corn stover bales typically have initial moisture content between 49% and 66%, with an average 
initial moisture content of 56%.  The dry matter (DM) density ranges from 87 to 114 kg DM/m3 with an 
average of 117 kg DM/m3. 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Estimated Time, Energy, and Variable Cost for Drying Corn Stover Bales to 12% Final Moisture 
Content with a Gas Burner or a Heat Pump (LMCO, 2010). 
Initial 
Moisture 
Content  
(% w.b) 
 
Drying Time 
 (hr) 
 
Heating 
Energy (kWh/t 
DM) 
 
 
Fan Energy 
(kWh/t DM) 
 
Energy Cost 
with Burner 
($/t DM) 
Energy Cost 
with Heat 
Pump  
($/ t DM) 
20 10.4 263 39 10.24 5.86 
25 18.1 456 68 17.75 10.16 
30 26.8 676 101 26.33 15.07 
35 36.9 931 139 36.23 20.74 
40 48.7 1228 183 47.79 27.36 
45 62.6 1578 235 61.44 35.17 
50 79.3 1999 297 77.82 44.55 
55 99.6 2514 374 97.85 56.02 
 
 
 
Efficient combustion of corn stover typically requires moisture content less than 12%.  Drying can 
be an energy intensive process in addition to the storage requirements of the dried stover.   Table 2 illustrates 
the typical energy costs of a burner vs. heat pump to dry corn stover. 
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Energy crops are perennial grasses and trees grown through traditional agricultural practices but are 
produced primarily for use as feedstocks for energy generation. The Bioenergy Feedstock Development 
Program at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has identified hybrid poplars, hybrid willows, and 
switchgrass as having the greatest potential for dedicated energy use over a wide geographic range (EPA, 
2007).   
Switchgrass (Panicum virgatum) is a common perennial C4 grass widely distributed across North 
America. C4 photosynthesis is an adaptation that evolved to alleviate the detrimental effects of 
photorespiration as a result of the gradual decline in atmospheric carbon dioxide levels.  This process ensures 
an efficient capture of CO2 from the atmosphere. On average, crops that use C4 photosynthesis are more 
productive and use less water and nitrogen than C3 crops (Wang et. al. 2010).     
Switchgrass is a dominant occurring plant in the central Great Plains grasslands, with impacts on 
both the structure and function of these ecosystems and will therefore be the focus energy crop for this 
analysis.  It is an important forage crop in pasture lands, and has been studied extensively over the past two 
decades for its potential value as an alternative energy source. In recent years, switchgrass has become a 
model species for biofuel production. Switchgrass was chosen as a prospective biofuel for its ability to 
increase soil quality, sequester carbon, and its wide range of suitable habitat.  Marginal lands that are not 
currently used for agricultural production may be suitable for switchgrass cultivation. The use of marginal 
lands for biofuel production is desirable because use of this land minimizes competition with food crops 
produced on lands of higher agricultural value. This species produces high biomass across a broad range of 
environments, requires low water and nutrient inputs compared to agronomic species (e.g., corn), and 
provides environmental benefits for degraded lands (e.g., reduced erosion, increased soil organic carbon).   
Cultivation of switchgrass as a perennial energy crop has also been considered for marginal lands 
currently in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). This program, developed in 1985 as part of the Food 
Security Act, provides compensation for landowners to rest their land from continual agricultural production. 
A byproduct of removing land from agricultural production is the establishment of permanent grass cover.  
As of 2012, there were 27.1 million acres enrolled in the Conservation Reserve Program (See Figure 14 
below). The CRP program has advanced conservation practices, with estimated decreases in soil erosion of 
220 million tons/year.  Native bird populations have increased by 2–52% (Hartman et. al., 2011).  
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Figure 14.  Conservation Reserve Program Enrollment.   
 
 
 
The cost of harvesting switchgrass is similar to most forage crops because switchgrass can be cut 
and baled with conventional mowers and balers. This makes this energy crop the easiest and cheapest to 
harvest.  Switchgrass has energy content of 6,060 Btu/lb (wet) and 8,670 Btu/lb (dry) and costs range from 
$35 to $50 per ton.  Consequently, switchgrass typically costs between $2.89 to $4.13/MMBtu (EPA, 2007).     
In addition to switchgrass for use in combustion, firms such as Great Plains Oil and Exploration 
encourage growers to raise oil seed crops such as camelina. It can be used as a feedstock for Biodiesel 
manufacturing.  Camelina (see Figure 15 below) is a biodiesel feedstock that is also attractive to growers 
because of its ability to thrive on marginal land with little fertilizer and water.  It can be harvested with 
conventional equipment and works well as a rotational crop.  The oil content of camelina seed ranges from 
29% to 39% (Putnam et. al, 1993).  The processing residue that is not used for fuel production can be used 
to make animal feed, fiberboard and glycerin (Priestman, 2008). 
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Figure 15.  Camelina.   
 
 
 
Biodiesel is unusual among biofuels in that it is almost interchangeable with conventional diesel 
fuel.   Most biodiesel production uses trans-esterification processing since it is relatively inexpensive and 
technologically simple.  Trans-esterification reacts the fats and oils in the feedstock with alcohol to produce 
the biodiesel and glycerol.  Figure 16 illustrates the process.  Moreover, net energy balance analysis indicates 
that biodiesel yields more than three times the energy in combustion it than it takes to produce it. 
Currently, biodiesel production and consumption is a small fraction of the country’s diesel market.  
In order to displace a larger percentage of conventional diesel fuel, a huge shift in agricultural resources 
would be required that would impact the global food supply.  Thus, while biodiesel processing is relatively 
inexpensive, the adverse impacts of expanding feedstock production could be severe.   Figure 17 compares 
some potential oil source crops. 
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Figure 16.  Biodiesel Transesterification Flow Diagram (Tabak, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17.  Oil Producing Crops Biodiesel Gallon/Acre Comparison (Tabak, 2009). 
 
 
 
Appendices B thru K contain the state agricultural overviews for North Dakota, South Dakota, 
Montana, Wyoming, Nebraska, Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Texas respectively.  
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5.4  Animal Feedstock  
 
Manure is collected on dairy farms where cows are confined, and also on beef feeding sites.  A 1,500 
pound dairy cow produces about 125 pounds of manure daily (Homan, 2013).  Table 3 shows dairy cow 
populations in the Great Plains states (USDA, 2015). 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Quantities of Milk Cows in the Great Plains States (USDA, 2015).  
State Number of Dairy Cows 
Montanac 14,000 
North Dakotaa 16,000 
South Dakotab 98,000 
Wyomingd 6,000 
Nebraskae 54,000 
Coloradof 145,000 
Kansasg 143,000 
Oklahomah 40,000 
New Mexicoi 323,000 
Texasj 470,000 
Total 1,309,000 
a See Appendix B North Dakota Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
b See Appendix C South Dakota Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
c See Appendix D Montana Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
d See Appendix E Wyoming Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
e See Appendix F Nebraska Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
f See Appendix G Colorado Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
g See Appendix H Kansas Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
h See Appendix I Oklahoma Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
i See Appendix J New Mexico Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
j See Appendix K Texas Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
 
 
 
On average, each cow daily produces the net equivalent output of 40 cubic feet biogas (Horman, 
2013).  Therefore, the Great Plains could produce over 50Mft3 of biogas daily, equivalent to 100 GWh of 
electricity. 
Anaerobic Digestion (AD) is the process by which organic substrate is decomposed by micro-
organisms in the absence of oxygen, i.e., in an enclosed vessel. End products are sludge and a biogas 
consisting primarily of methane and carbon dioxide (DeBruyn, 2012). Anaerobic digestion is a complex 
biochemical reaction series in four stages by different microorganisms as shown in Figure 18.  The stages are 
Hydrolysis, Acidogenisis, Acetogenesis and Methanogenesis.  
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Figure 18.  Anaerobic Decomposition Process (Long, N.D.). 
 
 
 
Several factors affect the rate of digestion and biogas production, temperature being the most 
critical. Anaerobic bacteria thrive at temperatures around 98°F, the mesophilic range, and also, 130°F, 
thermophilic.  Decomposition and biogas production occur more rapidly in the latter but the thermophillic 
process is sensitive to disturbances such as changes in feedstock.  Although mesophillic digesters must be 
larger to provide longer residence time for decomposition, this process is less sensitive to upset or change in 
operating regimen.  With this in mind, mesophillic range digesters will be the focus in this analysis. AgSTAR 
estimates that there are now 202 anaerobic digester systems operating at commercial livestock farms in the 
United States.  Figure 19 shows the distribution of AD Systems (US EPA, 2013). 
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Figure 19.  Commercial Livestock Farms with Anaerobic Digesters (AgStar, 2013). 
 
 
 
5.5  Algae Feedstock  
 
Microalgae (microscopic algae) include a type of photosynthetic microorganisms that use solar 
energy and carbon dioxide to produce biomass more efficiently and rapidly than terrestrial plants.   Algae is 
also a feedstock for refining biodiesel.  NREL found that high-rate open ponds can produce 30 grams of algae 
per square meter per day. The 30% lipids content, yielding 4,000 gallons of biodiesel fuel per acre annually, 
would be the only capital-cost effective approach of using algae as a biodiesel feedstock.  NREL also 
determined that native algae species should be used since they would take over the ponds anyway.  Finally, 
it was determined that the price of biodiesel produced from algal lipids would be in the $2-4 per gallon range 
(Putt, 2007).   
Microalgae growth at economically practical rates (> 20 grams per square meter per day averaged 
throughout a 300 day growing season) requires more atmospheric carbon dioxide than is naturally available. 
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The average carbon dioxide content is approximately 350 – 500 ppm by volume.  This, however, could be 
beneficial because algae may mitigate the effects of carbon dioxide from other sources such as power plants.  
Algae growth is best developed in the southeastern region of the U.S. due to the abundance of pond-
capable land, fresh water, sunshine, and animal husbandry.  Algaculture must be intimately coordinated with 
animal husbandry due to the complementary natures of the plant and animal kingdoms with respect to nutrient 
needs and waste products.  However, significant engineering would be required in the areas of nutrient feeds 
(notably carbon, nitrogen, and phosphorus) to the ponds, pond design, and the harvesting process (Putt, 2007).   
Algae can yield 10,000–15,000 gallons of oil per acre, more than conventionally farmed oil seed 
crops (Kram, 2008).  Extracting the oil from algae is similar to other feedstock processes such as pressing 
and trans-esterification. Figure 20 shows the locations of algae-related companies, research institutions, 
national laboratories, demonstration and commercial projects and other efforts undertaken by the Algae 
Biomass Organization (ABO) members and nonmembers alike. (Algae Biomass Organization, 2013). 
 
 
 
   
Figure 20.  Algae Related Establishments (ABO, 2013).   
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5.6  Woody Biomass  
Woody biomass feedstock includes trees (core wood), forest residues, mill residues and construction 
wood waste.  The average energy content of wood depends on the species and mixture of woods used.  Figure 
21 shows feedstock data from a recent Lockheed Martin project with the following characteristics:   
• Hard/Soft Wood Mix:  Typically 60-65% will be hard wood, with the balance being soft wood, 
although this can vary significantly (up to 50%).    
• Species will primarily be white spruce, balsam fir and red maple, although other species (noted 
below) will also be included in deliveries. 
• Moisture content is typically between 35-50% (average 46%).   
• Energy content is 8611 Btu/lb 
 
 
Figure 21.  Woody Biomass Feedstock Species and Design Assumptions (Lockheed Martin, 2013). 
 
 
 
Table 4 shows estimated annual cumulative forest residue quantities (Walsh, 2000). 
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Table 4.  Great Plains Estimated Annual Cumulative Forest Residue Quantities (Dry Tons) by Delivered 
Price and State (Walsh, 2000).   
State <$30/dry ton 
delivered 
<$40/dry ton 
delivered 
<$50/dry ton 
delivered 
North Dakota 11,000 17,000 21,700 
South Dakota 33,000 49,000 64,300 
Montanac 676,000 1,007,000 1,316,700 
Wyomingd 132,000 196,000 256,100 
Nebraskae 19,000 27,000 34,400 
Coloradof 373,000 554,000 720,300 
Kansasg 47,000 68,000 88,100 
Oklahomah 156,000 228,000 292,200 
New Mexicoi 557,000 814,000 1,050,700 
Texasj 245,500 Forage 5,069,579 
 
The principal categories of woody biomass conversion technologies for power and heat production 
are direct-fired and gasification systems. Specific technologies in the direct fire category include stoker 
boilers, fluidized bed boilers, and co-firing. The gasification category includes fixed bed gasifiers and 
fluidized bed gasifiers.  
Most existing biomass power plants are direct-fired systems. The fuel is burned in a boiler to 
produce high-pressure steam that is used to supply a steam turbine-driven power generator. In many 
applications, steam is extracted from the turbine at medium pressures and temperatures.  It is then used for 
process heat, space heating, or space cooling. Co-firing involves substituting biomass for a portion of the 
main fuel in an existing power plant boiler, such as coal. It is the most economic near-term option for 
introducing new biomass power generation. Because much existing equipment can be used to charge with 
biomass without major modifications, co-firing is less expensive than building a new biomass power plant. 
Compared to the coal it replaces, biomass reduces SO2, NOX, CO2, and other air emissions (U.S. EPA, 
2007).  
Biomass gasification involves heating solid biomass in an oxygen-starved environment to produce 
a fuel, a low or medium calorific gas generally called syngas or biogas.  Depending on the carbon and 
hydrogen content of the biomass and the gasifier’s properties, the heating value of the syngas, can range from 
100 to 500 Btu/cubic foot, which is 10% to 50% that of natural gas. Syngas heating value generally comes 
from the CO and hydrogen produced by the gasification process. The remaining constituents are primarily 
CO2 and other incombustible gases. Biomass gasification offers certain advantages over directly burning the 
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biomass because the gas can be cleaned and filtered to remove problem chemical compounds before its 
combustion.  
Most gasification processes include several steps. The primary conversion process, pyrolysis, is the 
thermal decomposition of solid biomass in an oxygen-starved environment to produce gases, liquids (tar), 
and char.  Pyrolysis releases the volatile components of the biomass feed at around 1,100° F through a series 
of complex reactions.  Biomass fuels are an ideal choice for pyrolysis because they have so many volatile 
components (70 to 85 percent on dry basis, compared to 30 percent for coal).  Further gasification processes 
convert the leftover tars and char into CO using steam and/or partial combustion.  In coal gasification, pure 
oxygen or oxygen-enriched air is preferred as the oxidant because the resulting syngas has a higher heating 
value, and the process is more efficient. In biomass gasification, oxygen is generally not used because 
biomass ash has a lower melting point than coal ash, and also because the scale of the plants is generally 
smaller (U.S. EPA, 2007). 
 Transportation costs often account for the majority of the cost of any fuel at the point of use. Thus, 
to be economically feasible, wood-fired power plants are generally located within 50 miles of the wood 
source (Combs, N.D).  The three Great Plains States with the highest wood residue content are Montana, 
Texas and Colorado. 
 
5.7  Feasibility Analysis Results 
 
Based on the data analyzed developing the great plains natural resources feasibility study, a 
conclusion was reached that wind and dairy cow manure are prevalent, sustainable and of great supply but 
can be distant from urban markets and distributed at low intensity.  North Dakota was chosen as the focal 
point of the study due to the population density being intermittent, dispersed and remote.  The combination 
of population demographics and feedstock resources resulted in North Dakota, South Dakota, and Minnesota 
region being chosen as the focal point for this new venture.   
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CHAPTER 6: RURAL ELECTRIFICATION ASSOCIATIONS FEASIBILITY STUDY  
 
The second feasibility study focuses on the potential customers of the integrated renewable energy 
idea.  Rural Electrification Associations (REAs) are ideal candidates since they can provide rural residential 
and industrial/agricultural power while also providing process fuels for local and export sales, increasing the 
reliability and independence of the REAs.   
 
6.1  History of REAs 
 
Historically, as late as the mid-1930s, nine out of 10 rural homes were without electric service 
(NRECA, 2014).  Private utility companies, who supplied electric power to most of the nation's consumers, 
argued that it was too expensive to string electric lines to isolated rural farmsteads (New Deal, 2015) 
The Roosevelt Administration believed that if private enterprise could not supply electric power to 
the people, then it was the duty of the government to do so (New Deal, 2015).  On May 11, 1935, Roosevelt 
signed Executive Order No. 7037 establishing the Rural Electrification Administration (REA) to construct 
transmission lines to serve “farms and small villages that are not otherwise supplied with electricity at 
reasonable rates.”  The REA was established as an agency of the U.S. Dept. of Agriculture and charged with 
administering loan programs for electrification and telephone service in rural areas. To implement those goals 
the administration made long-term, self-liquidating loans to state and local governments, to farmers' 
cooperatives, and to nonprofit organizations; no loans were made directly to consumers (NRECA, 2014).  
In 1935, Bartlett Electric Cooperative in Central Texas was first in the nation to turn on the lights 
for its members (Bartlett Electric Cooperatives, 2015).  By 1940, rural households with electricity had risen 
over 25 percent and the REA helped to establish 567 cooperatives across the nation providing electricity to 
1.5 million consumers in 46 states. By the early 1970s about 98% of all farms in the United States had electric 
service, a demonstration of REA's success.  The administration was abolished in 1994 and its functions 
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assumed by the Rural Utilities Service (Columbia Encyclopedia, 2014).  Today, nearly 900 electric co-ops 
serve 40 million people in 47 states. 
Electric Cooperatives are private, independent, non-profit electric utilities that are owned by the 
customers they serve.  They are incorporated under the laws of the states in which they operate and 
established to provide at-cost electric service.  Distribution cooperatives are the foundation of the rural 
electric network.  They deliver electricity to retail customers.  Table 5 is a list of all the distribution 
cooperatives in North Dakota (NRECA, 2015).  Generation & transmission cooperatives (G&Ts) provide 
wholesale power to distribution co-ops through their own generation or by purchasing power on behalf of the 
distribution members (NRECA, 2014).  Although there are fifteen distribution electrical cooperatives in 
North Dakota, there are only four G&T cooperatives - Upper Missouri, Basin Electric, Central Power and 
Minnkota Power.  However, Upper Missouri Cooperative is not located within the state of North Dakota. 
 
 
 
Table 5.  North Dakota Electrical Cooperatives (NRECA, 2015).   
Distribution Electrical Cooperative North Dakota Headquarter 
Location 
Generation & Transmission 
Supplier(s) 
Burke-Divide Columbus Upper Missouri and Basin 
Electric 
Mountrail-Williams Williston Upper Missouri and Basin 
Electric 
McKenzie Walford City Upper Missouri and Basin 
Electric 
Roughrider Dickinson Upper Missouri and Basin 
Electric 
Slope New England Upper Missouri and Basin 
Electric 
Verendrye Velva Central Power and Basin 
Electric 
McLean Garrison Central Power and Basin 
Electric 
Mor-Gran-Sou Flasher Basin Electric 
North Central Bottineau Central Power and Basin 
Electric 
KEM Linton Basin Electric 
Cavalier REC Langdon Minnkota Power 
Northern Plains Cando Central Power and Basin 
Electric 
Nodak Grand Forks Minnkota Power 
Cass County Kindred Minnkota Power 
Dakota Valley Milnor Central Power and Basin 
Electric 
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Since only three G&T suppliers within North Dakota are providing all of the state’s power and 
transmission, power contributors local to the distribution cooperatives could provide significant cost savings 
to customers and increase reliability.  However, an impediment to any potential new suppliers is the 
electricity grid. 
 
6.2  The Grid 
 
The North American electricity grid is the world's largest and most complex power generation, 
transmission, and distribution system. It delivers electricity to almost all people in the U.S., Canada and a 
portion of Mexico. This market demands about 830 GW (830,000 MW). The North American grid has about 
211,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines 230 kV and greater, and total assets of more than $1 trillion 
(Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 2011).  The system truly is a grid. Transmission lines run not only 
from power plants to load centers but also from one line to another, providing a redundant system that helps 
ensure smooth flow of power.  Figure 22 illustrates the United States transmission grid. 
 
Figure 22.  United States Transmission Grid (Global Energy Network Institute, 2014).   
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If a transmission line is out of service in one part of the grid, power can usually be rerouted through 
other lines to continue serving customers.  While the North American transmission system is commonly 
referred to as "the grid," there are actually three distinct power networks as shown on Figure 23. Eastern 
Interconnection covers the eastern two-thirds of the United States, and Canada from Saskatchewan East to 
the Maritime Provinces. The Western Interconnection includes the western third of the continental United 
States (excluding Alaska), Alberta and British Columbia in Canada, and a portion of Baja California Norte, 
Mexico. The third interconnection covers most of Texas.  
 The Eastern and Western Interconnects have limited ties to each other, and the Texas Interconnect 
is only linked to the others via direct current lines. Both the Western and Texas Interconnects are linked with 
Mexico, and the Eastern and Western are strongly tied with Canada. All electric utilities in the mainland 
United States are tied to at least one other utility via these power grids (Energy Library, 2009). However, the 
Great Plains is divided between all three Interconnects, which creates additional challenges in power 
integration, variations, distribution and reliability logistics, when exporting power to the rest of the country 
as shown in Figure 24. 
 
 
Figure 23.  North American Grid Interconnections (US DOE, 2013). 
60 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24.  Existing Transmission Lines in Great Plains (Shaded) of the United States (Prince, 2009). 
 
 
 
The transmission system was built over the past 100 years. The model vertically integrated utilities 
that produced electricity at large generation stations either close to fuel supplies or to transportation 
infrastructure, and then relied on transmission facilities to move electricity to their customers.  
Interconnections among neighboring utility systems were installed to increase reliability and share excess 
generation during certain times of the year. 
Transmission congestion or bottlenecks result when or where there is insufficient capability to 
accommodate all requests to ship power over the lines and maintain adequate safety margins for reliability. 
Because electricity cannot yet be stored economically, system operators may deny requests for service in 
order to prevent lines from becoming overloaded.  New transmission facilities would alleviate these stresses. 
However, the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) reports that investment in transmission 
facilities is lagging far behind both investment in new generation and growth in electricity demand. 
Construction of high voltage transmission facilities is expected to increase by only 6 percent (in line-miles) 
during the next 10 years, in contrast to the expected 20 percent increase in electricity demand and generation 
capacity (in MW) (US DOE, 2002). 
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Although it is not expected that transmission capacity would grow as quickly as new generation 
capacity or demand, even this projected growth is not adequate to ensure reliability and sustain continued 
growth of competitive regional wholesale electricity markets (Abraham, 2002).  "Everyone pretty much 
agrees that the current transmission system is not built to do this job," says Jon Wellinghoff, chairman of the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).   It is antiquated and inefficient, as shown by 9% of all 
power generated being lost in transmission, compared with 3.5% typical in other countries. Also, mandates 
for renewable energy in most states and proposed carbon-emissions curbs require that the system get greener 
and cleaner. As a result, billions of dollars of transmission upgrades must be made as shown in Figure 25 
(Carey, 2009). As shown, a significant amount of these upgrades are required in the Great Plains region. 
 
 
Figure 25.  Proposed Upgrades to the North American Electric Grid (Prince, 2009). 
 
 
 
The over-burdened Grid precludes the addition of a sufficient quantity of electricity generated from 
wind farms in the Great Plains that could supply power to the east and west coasts and replace existing fossil-
fuel power plants.  This is due to the fact that the Grid was developed such that the high-capacity transmission 
lines are located in areas of dense population as shown in Figure 24 and is the exact opposite of where current 
wind and biofuel feedstock resources are the most robust.  Significant investments in the Grid infrastructure 
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would be required to integrate Great Plains generated renewable power.  Transmission costs and losses favor 
consumption of power nearer to points of generation (Caplinger, 2012).   
 
6.3  Feasibility Analysis Results 
 
Based on the Rural Electrification Associations feasibility study, it is clear that distribution REAs 
are ideal candidate customers of an energy solution that would allow them to produce and provide power 
independently from the generation and transmission REAs they currently rely upon.  In addition, an optimal 
renewable energy solution cannot afflict the grid due to the grid’s inability to sustain continued growth and 
ongoing over-burdening issues.     
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CHAPTER 7: LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT AND PROJECT ECONOMICS FEASIBILITY 
STUDY1  
 
Feed-in tariffs and Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) are among the most prominent policies to 
address anthropogenic influence on climate change.  Implementation of RPS favorably affects renewable 
energy supply and rural development while reducing the land available for meeting demand for food and feed 
resulting from global population growth.  Even in the vast Great Plains of the United States, land requirements 
are primary considerations between increasing renewable energy capacity and food and feed production. 
This feasibility study applies life cycle assessment (LCA) and project economics to estimate and 
compare the land intensity and profitability of anaerobic digestion and wind energy projects in the Great 
Plains.  The results show that significantly more energy and revenue can be generated per hectare of land 
using wind versus anaerobic digestion.  Economically, the benefit-to-cost ratios of wind farms were almost 
twice as favorable as anaerobic digester facilities.  Wind farms have consistent benefit-to-cost ratios of 2.15 
while the anaerobic digester facilities benefit to cost ratios range from 1.2 to 1.25. 
Legislature changes to RPS could incentivize increasing the number of anaerobic digesters while 
also assisting in reversing the current trend of diminishing dairy farms while reducing climate change risks 
and creating new economic opportunities for renewable energy. 
 
7.1  Introduction 
 
The economic feasibility of energy choices, energy security challenges and environmental impacts 
of operations such as those caused by climate change are among the most significant factors considered in 
energy policy decisions today.   Since the 1990s, there has been significant growth in the number of renewable 
energy policies implemented to address these concerns, including quantity forcing and cost reduction (Beck 
and Martinot 2004).  Specifically, feed-in tariffs and Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) are among the 
most effective policies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions through using a regulatory mandate to increase 
the production of energy from renewable sources and remain the most commonly used support mechanisms. 
1A Life Cycle Perspective on Land Use and Project Economics of Electricity from Wind and Anaerobic 
Digestion by Carlo Ciliberti et. al. Energy Policy Volume 89 February, 2016, Pages 52-63. 
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Feed-in tariffs have been enacted in 108 jurisdictions at the national or state/provincial level around 
the world.  RPS policies are most popular at the state and provincial levels as they are in place in 26 countries 
(United States, China, Japan, Canada, Germany, etc.) at the national level and in 72 states/provinces (REN21, 
2015).  While beneficial for reducing climate change impacts, renewable technologies also contribute to land 
use challenges.  As the number of RPS initiatives that affect electricity supply companies increases, land use 
for renewable energy projects is expected to become more competitive with the steady growing demand for 
food and feed resulting from global population growth (Valentine et. al., 2012).  Ethical debates over land 
use may intensify as population growth, land availability and renewable energy projects all compete against 
rising food prices and population growth (Harvey et. al, 2011).  Based on population growth projections, it 
is predicted that by 2030, the world will need to produce 50% more food, 50% more energy and 30% more 
fresh water (Alexandros et. al., 2006). About half of global usable land is already in pastoral or intensive 
agriculture.  By 2050, the global population is projected to be 50% larger than today’s population and 
international grain demand is projected to double (Tilman et. al., 2002).  With this expected population 
growth and development pressures, land-use change will continue as food demand rises and urban areas 
expand in many parts of the world (DeFries et. al., 2004).  The availability and use of land will be one of the 
primary considerations in the majority of future energy projects, particularly for renewable energy, which is 
considered to have significant spatial requirements as also analyzed by Kimming et. al. (2011), Canals et. al. 
(2007), Loiseau et. al. (2013), and Fthenakis et. al (2009). 
There is tremendous potential for harnessing different forms of renewable energy that could add 
significantly to energy supply diversity in coming years.  Within the United States alone, twenty-nine states 
and Washington, D.C. now have RPS (US DOE, 2015).  As renewable energy competes financially with 
fossil fuels, these standards ensure that the public benefits of renewable energy continue to be realized as 
electricity markets become more competitive.  This form of policy instrument incents companies that sell 
electricity to retail customers to support renewable energy generation.  The standards range from modest to 
ambitious and qualifying energy technologies vary.  For example, Hawaii is targeting 40% of energy 
generated to be from renewable resources by 2030; California is targeting 50% by 2030 (Richardson, 2015) 
but both North Dakota and South Dakota are only targeting 10% by 2015 (Leon, 2013).    
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With increasing renewable capacity being deployed due to feed-in tariffs and RPS (Edwards et. al., 
2015), there is a need to better understand the competing land requirements of and economic challenges for 
different energy technologies.  To address this, we analyze the land use requirements and project economics 
for both wind and biofuel renewable energy production through anaerobic digestion (AD) of dairy cow wastes 
for several of the Great Plains states of the United States.  These two sources were chosen since they are 
prevalent resources available in the Great Plains and offer less competition to agricultural land assets than 
other renewable energy technologies such as photovoltaic or biomass projects.   
The Great Plains of the United States have been assessed as having enough wind to power the entire 
country (Wishart, 2011).  In fact, North Dakota alone has wind resources that, if harnessed, could provide 
more capacity than all the combined fossil-fueled power plants in the United States (NRDC, 2014).  In 
addition to wind, the land available in the Plains states are an excellent biomass resource for biofuel feedstock 
such as native grasses, corn stover, wheat straw, and organic and inorganic wastes due to the natural climate 
and abundant rainfall.  However, simultaneously meeting the rising demand for food and feed from global 
population growth along with increased demand for agriculturally based biofuels will require expanding 
agricultural production.  Industrialized nations, such as the United States, are unlikely to have the land base 
needed to meet their growing demand for agriculture-based biofuels and other forms of renewable energy 
concurrent with existing and future multiple use of landscapes (Gibbs et. al., 2008).  Due to having a relatively 
low population density, and abundant wind and anaerobic feedstock resources, the North Dakota, South 
Dakota and Minnesota region was chosen as the focal point for this analysis.   
There have been numerous assessments of the land footprint of wind energy; however, there has 
been little completed on AD facilities.  Existing assessments of wind farms such as the National Renewable 
Energy Laboratory (NREL) includes total land area but contain very limited published data on permanently 
disturbed land in North Dakota (Denholm, 2009).  Permanently disturbed land includes land alterations such 
as access or service roads, foundations, pads, Operations and Maintenance Facilities, etc. that make the land 
unusable for other services or activities such as farming or animal grazing.  Additional studies of wind farms 
such as Martinez et al (2009) analyze the life cycle of a wind turbine’s key components including the 
foundation but do not include each wind turbine’s access road in the analysis.    
66 
While several broad comparisons of the land use of energy include wind, AD has yet to be explored 
in depth.  Other studies such as that by Fthenakis and Kim (2009) compared land requirements of different 
types of renewable energy to conventional sources but the analysis did not include anaerobic digestion.  
Pimentel et al. (2002) focus on the quantity of biogas produced by anaerobic digestion; Berglund and 
Borjesson (2005) discuss material and energy flows of anaerobic digestion and biogas production; Cherubini 
et. al (2009) analyze biofuel and bioenergy systems not specific to anaerobic digestion concentrating on 
greenhouse gases;  Porschl et. al. (2010) analyze biogas production and energy efficiency but the authors did 
not analyze land use.   Anaerobic digester project studies through the AgSTAR program list the operational 
anaerobic digester projects that have received government subsidies (US EPA, 2013).  This information 
focuses on installed capacities, baseline systems and methane emission reductions but not land use 
requirements.  The information presented in this report advances the current state of data by analyzing and 
comparing AD to wind projects with respect to land use.   
During the implementation of feed-in tariffs and RPS, there is an opportunity to develop a variety 
of renewable energy technologies.  While there are clear greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction benefits, there is 
a need to better understand the unintended impacts or consequences of factors that inhibit meeting multiple 
sustainability targets so that they can be mitigated.  When food and energy projects compete for land, the 
commodity prices of products derived from land increase, which in turn may affect productivity, availability 
of land, and a greater contribution to GHG emissions, creating a potentially vicious circle (Harvey, 2010). 
This paper aims to address the research gap on land disturbance of both anaerobic digester and wind farm 
projects and to develop an approach for assessing land and economic impacts that can be applied across 
regions where wind and anaerobic digestion opportunities exist.   A specific case study of the upper Midwest, 
United States is examined to develop this approach where both of these technologies are promising options 
for meeting RPS commitments.  North Dakota has several established wind farms while South Dakota and 
Minnesota are home to established anaerobic digesters.  The focus of this analysis will be on North Dakota, 
South Dakota and Minnesota with a life cycle inventory of land use associated with each type of project.  We 
compare the results between the land use requirements of AD and wind energy projects which will then be 
used to identify an integrated renewable energy solution for the Great Plains.  Globally, such an approach 
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can provide additional decision support in the development of renewable energy policy where anaerobic 
digestion and wind energy resources are concurrently available. 
 
7.2  Life Cycle Assessment 
 
LCA (ISO 14040: 2006) is a decision making tool used to identify environmental burdens and 
evaluate the environmental consequences of a product, process or service over its life cycle (i.e. from 
extraction of resources through to the disposal of unwanted residuals).  However, the assessment of impacts 
caused by the use of land for production purposes has not been comprehensively addressed throughout the 
development and standardization process of LCA methodology (Gagnon, et. al (2002) and Cherubini et. al 
(2011)).  LCA was designed largely for products manufactured in industry, directed particularly at the 
assessment of intensive industrial production processes that take place on rather small areas of land.  Hence, 
land use was not identified early as an important form of impact on the environment (Doka et. al, 2002).  In 
contrast to industrial products, the production of renewable energy does not take place in a factory but can 
occupy large tracts of land, depending on technology and feedstock (Fthenakis, 2009).  Far more than for 
other energy products, an understanding of the impacts on land is essential for the full assessment of 
renewable energy projects due to the broad assumption that all renewable energy consumes vast amounts of 
land (Pimentel et. al, 2002).  One of the key challenges for the evaluation of land impacts in LCA is the 
challenge of quantifying the values society ascribes to land.  Since LCA methods do not offer a standardized 
approach to inventorying and evaluating land use, the development of supplemental methods is needed for 
the full quantification and assessment of environmental impacts. 
To ensure a manageable scope and to understand the end use impacts of AD and wind electricity, 
we refine the assessment of land value to economic rather than broader indicators such as biodiversity.  An 
economic assessment was performed to determine the financial differences between land uses.  Land 
economic value was calculated based on average installed costs amortized over the typical plant life span of 
30 years as well as annual operations and maintenance costs.  While we do not include non-monetary costs, 
this provides a basis for how values may be included within LCA, provided the values can be monetized. 
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7.3  Land Use Requirements 
 
The development of a wind power plant or a dairy farm AD facility results in a variety of temporary 
and permanent land disturbances.  Permanent disturbances include land occupied by foundations, crane pads, 
access roads, substations, service buildings, and other infrastructure which physically occupy land area, or 
create impermeable surfaces.  While land cleared around a turbine pad does not result in impervious surfaces, 
this modification represents a potentially significant degradation in ecosystem quality.  In addition to 
permanent impacts, which last the life of the facility, there are temporary impacts from plant construction.  
These impacts are associated with temporary construction storage, access and lay-down areas.  After plant 
construction is complete, the temporary disturbed land areas eventually return to their previous state.  The 
amount of time required to return to its “pre-disturbance condition” varies considerably; for example, it is 
estimated at two to three years for most grasslands and “decades” in desert environments (Denholm et. al, 
2009).  For this analysis, only permanent land disturbances are considered.   
 
7.3  Methods 
 
A life cycle assessment (LCA) framework following ISO (2006) standards is used to inventory the 
land disturbance for wind and AD electricity production.  To develop a more comprehensive approach to 
land use assessments of wind farms and anaerobic digesters in the Plains states, permanent land disturbances 
were measured and recorded based on satellite views of each facility (described in the Analysis section).  The 
electric energy delivered to market (MWh) is the product of the power production capacity, the nameplate 
capacity factor, and time.  We estimate land intensity as the ratio between total land disturbed and electrical 
energy produced in one hour (ha/MWh) in equation 6 in the Analysis section.  All fifteen major wind farms 
throughout North Dakota are considered in this analysis.  Currently there are no AD systems operating at 
commercial livestock farms in North Dakota.  Therefore, we consider four of the closest AD systems to North 
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Dakota, which produce electricity in South Dakota and Minnesota.  Figure 26 shows the locations of the 
analyzed wind farms and anaerobic digester projects.   
Figure 26.  Locations of Wind Farms and AD Projects Assessed within this Study.  Wind Locations are 
from the US Geological Survey (USGS, 2014) and AD Locations from AgStar (EPA, 2014). 
 
 
 
The functional unit used in the life cycle assessment is 1 megawatt (MW) of power and 1 megawatt-
hour (MWh) of electricity generated.  The metric used to compare the land use requirements between wind 
energy and dairy farm waste anaerobic digestion is the hectare. 
The life cycle process flow diagram for AD (Figure 27) and wind (Figure 28) outline the system 
boundary and identify land inputs for raw material extraction, manufacturing of equipment, transportation, 
facility construction, operation and maintenance, transmission and distribution, and end of plant life.  
The LCA system boundary focuses only on project construction, operation and maintenance 
processes and activities involved in the land inventory analysis.  These aspects represent the Technological 
Whole System (TWS) as a method used for the portion of the LCA that is central to the investigation (Tillman, 
1993).    
In addition, transmission lines and utility pole land disturbances are purposely excluded from the 
system boundaries since available data are very inconsistent and sparse, indicating a need for a robust 
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assessment which is out of the scope of this study.  Many of the wind turbine transmission cables are either 
underground or documentation on the overhead lines is unavailable.  For example, of the fifteen major wind 
farms in North Dakota, only eleven of the substations could be identified while most of the transmission lines 
could not be verified to be above-ground or below-ground cables as shown in Table 6.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 27.  AD Life Cycle Process Flow Diagram.  The Shaded Area Represents the System Boundary 
Considered in this Study. 
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Figure 28.  Wind Farm Life Cycle Process Flow Diagram.  The Shaded Area Represents the System 
Boundary Considered in this Study. 
 
Table 6.  North Dakota Wind Farm Transmission/Distribution Data.   
 
Wind Farm  
 
Turbine 
 (Qty) 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Transmission 
Voltage (kV) 
Substation 
Identified 
Transmission 
Detailsa 
Ashtabula I 131 196.5 230 Identified 9.5 mile line connect   
 Pillsbury substation 
Ashtabula II 80 120.0 230 Identified 9.5 mile line 
connected to 
Pillsbury 
substation 
Ashtabula III 39 62.5 230 Identified 9.5 mile line 
connected to 
Pillsbury 
substation 
Baldwin 66 102.4 34.5 ND Unknown 
Bison 101 292.0 230 Identified 465 mile DC line 
from Square Butte 
substation to 
Arrowhead 
substation 
Cedar Hills 13 19.5 57 Identified Connecting 
Bowman, ND to 
Baker, MT 
Langdon 
Wind 
133 199.5 115 Identified 35 mile Langdon 
to Hensel 
Luverne 
North Field 
33 49.5 230 Identified Underground 
connection lines 
and above ground 
transmission line 
combination 
Oliver I 22 50.6 ND ND Underground 
collection cables 
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Oliver II 32 48.6 ND ND Underground 
collection tables 
N. Dakota I & 
II 
41 61.5 41.6 Identified ND 
Rugby 71 149.1 230 ND 465 mile DC line 
from Square Butte 
substation to 
Arrowhead 
substation 
Prairie Winds 77 115.5 ND Identified ND 
Tatanka 61 92.0 230 Identified 55 miles of 
underground 
cables and 15 mile 
transmission line 
Velva 18 11.8 ND Identified ND 
ND = No Data 
a Transmission data from http://eerscmap.usgs.gov/windfarm/ 
 
7.4  Land and Economic Analysis 
 
Determining the permanently disturbed land areas for the wind farms and anaerobic digester 
facilities involved several steps.  For each wind farm, the location and quantity of turbines was found in 
published data and satellite maps from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS, 2014) and google maps.  
Operational anaerobic digester projects within the United States were identified in published data and satellite 
maps using the Environmental Protection Agency’s AgSTAR interactive map (EPA, 2014) and google maps.   
Next, the sites were divided into smaller, more manageable areas so that permanently disturbed land 
could be quantified as illustrated in Figures 29 and 30.    Appendix L through Appendix Z show the detail 
for each North Dakota wind farm. 
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(a)                                                      (b)                                                  (c) 
Figure 29.  Satellite Images of a Wind Farm.  (a) Complete Wind Farms Divided into Manageable Areas.  
(b)  Wind Turbine Foundation and Access Road Width.  (c)  Access Roads for Area 4. 
 
 
Figure 30.  Satellite Image of an Anaerobic Digester Facility with Measurements.   
 
 
 
Each area was then measured using the appropriate scale to determine the length and width of access 
roads and the radius of turbine foundations.  The permanently disturbed land area was determined by the 
following equations: 
AreaTF = (πr2) (hectares).                        (1) 
AreaAR = (LW) (hectares)                        (2) 
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AreaAD =(LW) (hectares)                        (3) 
where TF is the turbine foundation, AR is the access road, r is the radius of the foundation; L is the 
length of the access road/pad; W is the width of the access road/pad; and AD is the anaerobic digester facility. 
Finally, the measurements for all permanently disturbed land areas on each wind farm such as 
turbine foundations, access roads and substation areas were summed using equation (4).  A tot =  ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1                 (4) 
where Atot is the total area disturbed and n is the number of wind turbines, access roads, foundation 
pads, facilities, etc.. 
The value of the total area disturbed is calculated by multiplying the total disturbed area by the 
current land market value.   
LVmarket = A tot  * MV                                                       (5) 
where LVmarket is the market land value and MV is the market value specific to the North Dakota, 
South Dakota and Minnesota region of the United States. 
The summation of all the permanently disturbed land areas was then used to calculate the new Land 
Occupation Value in hectares per Megawatt:   
LOV = 𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)
𝐶𝐶(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)∗𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶                (6) 
where LOV is the Land Occupation Value in hectares per Megawatt, C(MW) is the installed 
capacity in Megawatts and CF is the capacity factor. 
The average installed capital cost of each wind farm was determined using the United States 
Department of Energy data for wind farms between 5 MW and 200 MW.  Since the project costs were 
identified as being between $1893/kW to $2692/kW (US DOE, 2014), the midpoint of $2292.50/kW was 
used for our calculations, with the extremes tested in the sensitivity analysis as shown in Table 1.  For 
anaerobic digester projects, installed costs range between $1000 and $2000 per cow depending on the size of 
the herd (AgSTAR, 2013).  $1500 per cow was used for this analysis.   
CCAI = Cunit * Fcap                           (7) 
where CCAI is the average installed capital cost; Cunit is the project cost per unit of measure; and Fcap 
is the facility’s capacity.   
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From the average installed capital cost of the wind farm, the annual loan payment was calculated 
based on a 30 year loan that was obtained for 90% of the installed cost at a 5% interest rate.  It was assumed 
that 10% of the installed cost would be paid as cash.  Annual loan payments are based on 12 monthly loan 
payments.   
Annual Loan Payment = 12[Pr (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑛𝑛(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑛𝑛−1]           (8) 
where P is the amount borrowed, r is the monthly interest rate; and n is the life of the loan in months.    
Annual operations and maintenance costs are between $30 and $50 per kW for turbines 1 MW or 
greater in the United States (US DOE, 2014).  The average value of $40 per kW was selected for our annual 
O&M costs.   
ACTotal = ALP + OM        (9) 
where ACTotal is the total annual costs; ALP is the annual loan payment; and OM are the annual 
operations and maintenance costs. 
Annual electricity revenue for wind farms was calculated using the North Dakota electricity price 
of $0.0862/kWh (Otter Trail Power Company, 2014).  There is also a federal production tax credit for wind 
energy extended thru 2016 of $0.023/kWh (DSIRE, 2014).   
ARTotal = AER + APTC        (10) 
where ARTotal is the total annual revenue; AER is the annual electricity revenue; and APTC is the 
annual production tax credit. 
A benefit-to-cost ratio was then developed for each wind farm to summarize the value of each 
project. 
The capital cost loan metrics for the anaerobic digester projects were kept the same as the wind 
farms.  The annual loan payment was calculated based on a 30 year loan that was obtained for 90% of the 
installed cost at a 5% interest rate.  For consistency, it is assumed that 10% of the installed cost was paid as 
cash.  Annual loan payments are based on 12 monthly loan payments.  Equation 8 was used to calculate the 
annual loan payment. 
Annual dairy farm costs are based on the USDA's Agriculture Resource Management Survey of 
milk producers and updated using current USDA average production per cow and production input indexes 
(USDA, 2014).  Average annual dairy farm costs in the United States of $19.2/cwt were used.   
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ACAD = ALP + AFC              (11) 
where ACAD is the total annual costs for the AD facility; ALP is the annual loan payment and AFC 
is the annual farm costs.   
For consistency in comparing wind and AD facilities, the annual electricity revenue for AD facilities 
was calculated using the North Dakota electricity price of $0.0862/kWh (Otter Trail Power Company, 2014).  
The state of Minnesota also has a $0.015/kWh electricity generation by anaerobic digestion incentive.  
However, neither states of North and South Dakota have any such incentive (DSIRE, 2014).   
Carbon Credits are verified units of voluntary reduction of atmospheric carbon emissions, usually 
expressed as Carbon Reduction Tons (CRT's) or Tons of CO2 Equivalent (CO2E).  AD facilities generate 
carbon credits by reducing greenhouse gas emissions which can be an additional source of revenue. 
Another revenue source for AD facilities is animal bedding, which is a byproduct of the AD 
digestate.  Digestate is the liquid or solid material generated after the anaerobic digestion process.  The solids 
are used “as is” for such uses as animal bedding (Alexander, 2012). 
Dairy farms themselves generate revenue from the milk that is produced by the herd population.  An 
average United States dairy cow produces 22,258 pounds of milk annually (USDA, 2014).  Since milk is 
measured in hundred pound weight or cwt, equation 12 is used to calculate the annual milk production. 
AMP = (22,258Lb/cow *Xcows )/100          (12) 
where AMP is the annual milk production in hundred pound weight.  Annual Milk Revenue is 
calculated by multiplying the cwt quantity of milk by the current milk price within the United States of $23.20 
(USDA, 2014). 
AMR = $23.20/cwt * AMP            (13) 
where AMR is the annual milk revenue. 
ARAD = AER + ASIAD +CC +AMR+AAB           (14)  
where ARAD is the total annual revenue for AD facilities; AER is the annual electricity revenue; 
ASIAD is the annual state incentive for AD generated electricity; CC is the carbon credits; AMR is the annual 
milk revenue; and AAB is the annual animal bedding savings. 
A benefit-to-cost ratio was then developed for each AD facility to summarize the value of each 
project. 
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A number of the model inputs are subject to uncertainty, annual variability or differences across 
projects.  To examine uncertainty, a sensitivity analysis was performed for each of the factors listed in Table 
7 and described in the Results section. 
 
 
 
Table 7.  Wind Turbine and AD  Facility Baseline and Boundary Data.   
 
Sensitivity Factor  
Lower 
Value 
Baseline 
Value 
Higher 
Value 
 
Electricity Price 
 
$0.06/kWh 
 
$0.0862/kWh 
 
$0.10/kWh 
Interest Rate 3% 5% 7% 
Wind Capital Cost  $1893/kW $2292.5/kW $2692/kW 
AD Capital Cost $1K/Cow $1.5K/Cow $2K/Cow 
Wind O&M Costs $30/kW $40/kW $50/kW 
Dairy Milk Revenue $21/cwt $23.2/cwt $25/cwt 
Dairy Farm Costs $18.cwt $19.2/cwt $21/cwt 
AD Incentive $0.01/kWh $0.015/kWh $0.02/kWh 
 
 
 
7.5  Wind Farm Results 
 
All the North Dakota Wind Farms studied had consistently favorable benefit-to-cost ratios of 2.15.  
Table 8 shows revenues and costs for each North Dakota wind farm. 
 
 
 
Table 8.  Revenues and Costs for North Dakota Wind Farms.   
 
 
Facility 
Name  
Annual 
Electricity 
Revenuea 
($M) 
Production 
Tax 
Creditb 
($M) 
 
Installed 
Capital 
Costc ($M) 
Annual 
Loan 
Paymentd 
($M) 
Annual 
O&M 
Costse 
($M) 
Bison $86 $23         $669 $39       $12 
Ashtabula I $58 $15 $450 $26 $8 
Langdon $59 $16 $457 $27 $8 
Rugby $44 $12 $342 $20 $6 
Baldwin $30 $8 $235 $14 $4 
Prairie Winds  $34 $9 $265 $15 $5 
Ashtabula II $35 $9 $275 $16 $5 
Tatanka $27 $7 $210 $12 $4 
Cedar Hills $6 $2 $45 $3 $1 
Ashtabula III $18 $5 $143 $8 $3 
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Luverne $15 $4 $113 $7 $2 
Oliver II $14 $4 $111 $6 $2 
N. Dakota I & II $18 $5 $141 $8 $2 
Oliver I $15 $4 $116 $7 $2 
Velva $3 $1 $27 $2 $0 
 
Table 8 (continued) 
 
a Annual Electricity Revenue is based on the wind farm nameplate capacity multiplied by the North Dakota 
wind capacity factor of 0.389 (US Energy Information Administration, 2012) for 8760 hours per year at 
$0.0862 per kWh (Otter Trail Power Company, 2014). 
b Federal production tax credit for wind energy extended thru 2016 of $0.023/kWh (DSIRE, 2014). 
c Based on the midpoint project data costs from the US DOE data for wind farms between 5 and 200 MW. 
d Annual loan payment based on a 30 year loan obtained for 90% of the installed cost at a 5% interest rate. 
e Annual O&M costs based on the average of $40 per kW for turbines greater than 1 MW (US DOE, 2014). 
 
 
 
A sensitivity analysis was performed on the electricity price, loan interest rate, O&M cost and capital 
cost variables to see which had the greatest impact on the benefit-to-cost ratio.  Figure 31 summarizes the 
sensitivity analysis. 
 
Figure 31.  North Dakota Wind Farm Sensitivity Analysis of Benefit-to-Cost Ratio Input Variables. 
 
 
 
Analyzing each variable independently, the price of electricity had the greatest impact on the 
benefit-to-cost ratio range (1.6 to 2.4).  A lower loan interest rate had the potential to increase the benefit-to-
cost ratio the most at 2.58 with a 3% loan over 30 years.  Capital costs per kW also had a significant impact 
while variations in O&M costs had the least impact.   
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Using a life cycle framework, North Dakota Wind Farms have a benefit-to-cost ratio of 2.15 and 
depending on their nameplate capacity, use between 2 and 129 hectares of permanently disturbed land (Figure 
32 and Table 9).  
 
                      
Figure 32.  North Dakota Wind Farms Installed Capacity vs. Permanently Disturbed Land. 
 
 
 
Table 9.  North Dakota Wind Farm Land, Capacity, Generation and Benefit-to-Cost Ratio Data.   
 
 
Facility 
Name  
 
Perm 
Disturbed 
Land (ha) 
 
 
 
MW 
Lifetime 
Electricity 
Generation 
GWha 
Land 
Occupation 
Value 
(ha/MW)) 
Benefit 
To 
Cost 
Ratio 
Bison 129 114 28,706 1.1 2.15 
Ashtabula I 94 76 19,318 1.2 2.15 
Langdon 85 78 19,612 1.1 2.15 
Rugby 75 58 14,658 1.3 2.15 
Baldwin 66 40 10,067 1.7 2.15 
Prairie Winds  47 45 11,355 1.0 2.15 
Ashtabula II 38 47 11,797 0.8 2.15 
Tatanka 33 36 8,995 0.9 2.15 
Cedar Hills 26 8 1,917 3.4 2.15 
Ashtabula III 25 24 6,194 1.0 2.15 
Luverne 20 19 4,866 1.0 2.15 
Oliver II 19 19 4,778 1.0 2.15 
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N. Dakota I & II 17 24 6,046 0.7 2.15 
Oliver I 14 20 4,974 0.7 2.15 
Velva 2 5 1,160 0.5 2.15 
a Lifetime electricity generation is based on the wind farm nameplate capacity multiplied by the North 
Dakota wind capacity factor of 0.389 (US Energy Information Administration, 2012) for 8424 hours per 
year over a 30 year facility life span.  8424 generation hours per year is used based on 14 days downtime 
per year for servicing and maintenance. 
The hourly land occupational value of North Dakota Wind Farms averages 1.2 hectares/megawatt.  
The analysis aligns with the study by NREL, which reported that the permanent land disturbances range from 
approximately 0.06 hectares/MW to approximately 2.4 hectares/MW for wind farms greater than 20 
megawatts constructed between 2000 and 2008 in the United States (Denholm, 2009).  Although NREL did 
not use data from most of North Dakota’s wind farms, very specific satellite imagery to measure direct land 
consumed was used and found that the feasibility values fall within the range of the national average. 
Deviations from a linear trend line can be attributed to factors such as the manufacturer, make and 
size of the wind turbines and age of the wind farm as efficiencies in design, development and construction 
increased as more wind farms were erected. 
 
7.6  Anaerobic Digester Results 
 
The primary dairy farm revenue stream is the sale of milk products.  Costs related to a dairy farm 
include operating costs such as feed, veterinary and medicine, allocated overhead, etc. which are identified 
in Table 10.  Adding an AD facility to an existing dairy farm will not only offset electricity costs but it will 
provide environmental benefits such as GHG abatement, organic waste reduction, groundwater pollution 
mitigation, pathogen destruction and odor reduction. 
 
 
 
Table 10.  Typical Dairy Farm Costs   
U.S monthly dairy costs of 
production per cwt of milk sold, 2014a  
  
Average 
Operating costs: 
    Feed 
$/cwt 
9.15 
    Veterinary and medicine 0.78 
    Marketing 0.24 
    Repairs 0.56 
    Total operating costs 10.74 
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Allocated overhead:  
    Hired labor 1.53 
    Opportunity cost of unpaid labor 2.29 
    Capital recovery of machinery 
and 
        equipment 
3.69 
    Taxes and insurance 0.20 
    General farm overhead 0.71 
    Total, allocated overhead 8.41 
  
Table 10 (continued)  
Total costs listed 19.2 
  
a Data are based on the U.S., monthly dairy costs of production per cwt of milk sold, 2014 (USDA, 2014). 
 
 
 
Anaerobic digesters make several contributions to climate change mitigation.  The digesters capture 
biogas that would have been emitted because of the nature of organic waste management at the farm where 
the digester is in operation.  By capturing and combusting biogas, anaerobic digesters are preventing fugitive 
methane emissions. Methane is a potent GHG with a global warming potential 34 times that of CO2 (Myhre 
and Shindell, 2013).  Another benefit of anaerobic digesters is the displacement of fossil fuel-based energy 
that occurs when biogas is used to produce heat or electricity.  Biogas is generally considered to be a carbon-
neutral source of energy because the carbon emitted during combustion was atmospheric carbon that was 
recently fixed by plants or other organisms, as opposed to the combustion of fossil fuels where carbon 
sequestered for millions of years is emitted into the atmosphere. As such, substituting energy from biogas for 
energy from fossil fuels cuts down on GHG emissions associated with energy production.  GHG emissions 
are also reduced when the nutrient-rich digestate created from anaerobic digestion is used to displace fossil-
fuel based fertilizers used in crop production (Centre for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2015). 
Anaerobic digesters can reduce nutrient runoff from farms into waterways due to the containment 
of manure.  The runoff and leaching of phosphorous from land, increases eutrophication (nutrient loading) 
and the potential for water pollution in local waterways.  Additionally, utilizing manure decreases the time it 
sits at the farm contributing to odor and pest issues (e.g., as a breeding ground for pests and disease vectors) 
(Global Methane Initiative, 2013).   
Bedding for the cows is also a cost to dairy farmers.  With anaerobic digesters, the effluent is suitable 
for animal bedding and saves $23.25 per cow per year (Tonneson, Lon, 2007).   
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AD facilities are also eligible for carbon credits since they remove greenhouse gases from the 
environment.  A credit is a measure representing one megatonne (a mass equal to 1,000 kilograms) of carbon 
dioxide. This is either saved from being emitted or removed from the Earth's atmosphere (Wisler, 2015).  The 
price paid for carbon credits fluctuates in a dynamic market but in 2012, the price paid for each credit was 
$5.90 in the Voluntary Market (Lang, 2013).  This price was used in the business model as an example of 
revenue that could be achieved in the voluntary market.   
The AD facilities studied all had similar benefit-to-cost ratios ranging from 1.20 to 1.25.  Table 11 
shows revenues and costs for the studied AD facilities. 
 
 
 
Table 11.  Revenues and Costs for Studied AD Facilities.   
 
 
 
Facility 
Name  
 
 
 
 
Cows 
 
Annual 
Electricity 
Revenuea 
($K) 
 
Annual 
Milk 
Revenue
b($K) 
State 
Electricity 
Revenue 
Incentivec 
($K) 
 
 
Annual 
Bedding
d ($K) 
 
  
Carbon 
Creditse 
($K) 
 
Installed 
Capital 
Costf 
($M) 
 
Annual 
Loan  
Payment
g ($K) 
Northern 
Plains 
Dairy 
3000 $143 $15,492 $25 $70 $20 $12 $261 
Midwest 
Dairy 
Institute 
2000 $207 $10,328 $0 $50 $13 $8 $209 
Haubens-
child 
Farms 
900 $85 $4,647 $15 $21 $6 $8 $78 
District 
45 Dairy 
5520 $1,174 $28,504 $204 $128 $36 $6 $480 
a Annual electricity revenue is based on the AD nameplate capacity multiplied by an average capacity 
factor of 0.73 (Krom, 2008) for 8760 hours per year at $0.0862 per kWh (Otter Trail Power Company, 
2014). 
b Annual milk revenue is calculated based on $23.20/cwt (USDA, 2014).  CWT is determined by 
multiplying the average annual output per cow of 22, 258 pounds of milk (USDA, 2014) by the number of 
cows and dividing by 100. 
c State of Minnesota anaerobic digestion electricity generation incentive of $0.015/kWh (DSIRE, 2014). 
d AD digestate is used for animal bedding which saves $23.25 per cow annually (Tonneson, 2007). 
e Carbon credits calculated based on $5.90 per credit (Lang, 2013). 
f Based on the midpoint project data costs of $1500/cow from AgStar. 
g Annual loan payment based on a 30 year loan obtained for 90% of the installed cost at a 5% interest rate. 
 
 
 
A sensitivity analysis was performed on milk revenue, annual farm costs, electricity price, loan 
interest rate, state incentives and capital cost variables to see which had the greatest impact on the benefit-
to-cost ratio.  Figure 33 summarizes the sensitivity analysis. 
83 
 
Figure 33.  AD Sensitivity Analysis of Benefit-to-Cost Ratio Input Variables.   
 
 
 
Analyzing each variable independently, the price of milk had the greatest impact on the benefit-to-
cost ratio range (1.11 to 1.31), followed closely by annual farm costs (1.11 to 1.29).  Unlike the wind 
sensitivity analysis, interest rates, state incentives for electricity production by AD and capital cost had very 
minimal impact (1.21 to 1.22) on the benefit-to-cost ratio.   
The Anaerobic Digester Facilities studied have a benefit-to-cost ratio between 1.20 and 1.25 and 
use between 14 and 105 hectares of permanently disturbed land as shown in Figure 34 and Table 12.   See 
Appendix AA through AD for additional data. 
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Figure 34.  Installed Capacity vs. Permanently Disturbed Land of Studied AD Facilities.   
 
 
 
Table 12.  Studied AD Facility Land, Capacity, Generation and Benefit-to-Cost Ratio Data.   
 
 
Facility 
Name  
 
Perm 
Disturbed 
Land (ha) 
 
 
 
MW 
Lifetime 
Electricity 
Generation 
GWha 
 
Land 
Occupation 
(ha/MW)) 
Benefit 
To 
Cost 
Ratio 
Northern Plains 
Dairy 
105 0.2 48 551 1.20 
Midwest Dairy 
Institute 
81 0.3 69 297 1.21 
Haubenschild Farms 46 0.1 29 405 1.22 
District 45 Diary 14 1.6 393 9 1.25 
a Lifetime electricity generation is based on the AD nameplate capacity multiplied by the capacity factor of 
0.73 (Krom, 2008) for 8424 hours per year over a 30 year facility life span.  8424 generation hours per year 
is used based on 14 days downtime per year for servicing and maintenance. 
 
 
 
AD land occupation values vary greatly between facilities and are all significantly higher than wind 
energy.  The size of the dairy farm herd will affect the land occupation value as well as the waste management 
system employed.  Anaerobic digesters may still be well worthwhile as part of an existing agro-ecosystem 
infrastructure currently in place on dairy farms.  Manure is typically added to the digester daily via a manure 
flushing system that is likely to be already utilized on the dairy farm (Goodrich, 2005). 
There has been a steady decline in the number of dairy farms in the United States since 2002 (USDA, 
2014).  One of the contributing factors to this decline is the continuing struggle for profitability.  Ironically, 
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adding an AD facility only slightly alters the benefit to cost ratios of the dairy farms studied as shown in 
Table 13.   
 
 
 
Table 13.  Benefit-to-Cost Ratios of Studied Diary Farms with and without AD.   
 
 
Facility Name  
 
Number of 
Cows 
Benefit-to- 
Cost Ratio 
Without AD 
Benefit-to- 
Cost Ratio 
With AD 
 
Northern Plains Dairy 
 
3000 
 
1.21 
 
1.20 
Midwest Dairy Institute 2000 1.21 1.21 
Haubenschild Farms  900 1.21 1.22 
District 45 Dairy     5520 1.21 1.25 
 
 
 
Since all 50 states and Puerto Rico currently have dairy farms (Dairy Farming Today, 2014), federal 
and state incentives would have a significant impact on profitability, which could reverse the declining trend 
in dairy farming.  Anaerobic digesters are a tremendous renewable energy resource for lands already 
dedicated to agriculture.  In addition to providing odor abatement when using wastes as a feedstock, the 
resulting biogas can be combusted to run a generator producing electricity and heat (called a co-generation 
system), burned as a fuel in a boiler or furnace, or cleaned and used as a natural gas replacement. 
One of the main reasons that there are so few commercial dairy anaerobic digester systems currently 
in North Dakota is the lack of support by incentives provided by North Dakota’s Renewable Portfolio 
Standards.  North Dakota does not have a state specific mandated RPS, rather it has a non-binding renewable 
energy goal to generate 10 percent of the electricity sold in the state by 2015 (DSIRE, 2014).  As of 2013, 
16% of North Dakota’s net electricity generation was from wind (US Energy Information Administration, 
2014).  With only a voluntary goal coupled with among the lowest electricity prices in the country and a large 
percentage of North Dakota’s electricity generated from coal-fired power plants, there are no financial 
incentives to utilize only AD systems to generate electricity.   
South Dakota, which has one of the nearest anaerobic digester projects in close proximity to North 
Dakota, also has a voluntary 10 percent goal by 2015 (DSIRE, 2014).  South Dakota currently generates 
53.5% of its electricity by hydroelectric and 4.9% from wind (Institute for Energy Research, 2014).  But 
unlike North Dakota, South Dakota is an observer of the Midwestern Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction 
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Accord.  The Accord was signed in November 2007 as a part of the Midwestern Governors Association 
Energy Security and Climate Change Summit to set regional GHG emission reduction targets and develop a 
multi-sector cap-and-trade system and complementary policies to help achieve these targets (Centre for 
Climate and Energy Solutions, 2014) which demonstrates the state’s commitment to alternative energy and 
the environment.   
In contrast, Minnesota, which has 3 of the 4 closest anaerobic digester projects in proximity to North 
Dakota, has a state mandated RPS of 31.5% of total retail electricity sales by 2020.  The eligible renewable 
technologies specifically include anaerobic digestion in the applicable sectors of municipal utility, investor-
owned utility, and rural electric cooperatives (DSIRE, 2014).   
Further analysis was performed to calculate the levelized cost of energy (LCOE), which is defined 
as the net cost to install a renewable energy system divided by its expected life-time energy output.  The Cost 
of Renewable Energy Spreadsheet Tool (CREST) which was developed by the National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory (NREL) was used (NREL, 2010).  Inputs into the CREST tool include data on the wind farm and 
AD facility’s performance, cost, operation, tax and finances.  The output includes the calculated LCOE.  The 
LCOE for Langdon and all of the other North Dakota Wind Farms studies were all $0.0275/kWh.  The output 
LCOE for Haubenschild Farms is $0.0415/kWh.  Each AD facility had a different LCOE calculation as 
summarized in Table 14: 
 
 
 
Table 14. Studied AD Facilities LCOE Calculations.   
 
 
Facility Name  
 
LCOE 
₡/kWh 
Financial Incentive 
Needed to Equal Wind 
LCOEa 
 
Northern Plains Dairy 
 
9.45 
 
39% 
Midwest Dairy Institute 5.15 25% 
Haubenschild Farms  4.15 16% 
District 45 Dairy 1.15 None 
a Financial incentives are based on the percentage of capital cost needed to offset the total capital cost such 
that the AD LCOE equals the Wind LCOE of 2.75 ₡/kWh.  Grants and in-kind assistance are based on 
similar incentives by AgSTAR and state programs described by Lazarus and Rudstrom (2007). 
 
 
 
LCOE is a convenient summary measure of the overall competiveness of different generating 
technologies (US EIA, 2015).  Since the AD facilities LCOE varies significantly as compared to the wind 
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farm’s steady LCOE of 2.75 ₡/kWh, each AD facility must be analyzed to determine if the investment 
decisions are viable for each specific dairy farm.  However, in a study by Lazarus and Rudstrom, AgSTAR 
and the Minnesota Department of Agriculture provided financial and technical assistance to an 800-cow dairy 
farm in Minnesota.  These incentives were reportedly motivated by policymakers’ and the utility’s desire to 
demonstrate the viability of the technology and motivate other farms to follow suit.  The grants and assistance 
amounted to over 36% of the capital investment (Lazarus and Rudstrom, 2007).  Each AD facility studied 
was then analyzed to determine the financial incentives necessary to be comparable with the wind LCOE as 
shown in Table 14.  The variations in incentives necessary to compete with wind range from a worst case of 
39% of the capital costs to a best case of AD being more competitive than wind.  This shows that one flat 
incentive rate would not be applicable to all AD projects due to the broad range of AD variabilities affecting 
cost competitiveness.   
 
7.7  Policy Implications and Conclusion 
 
There is tremendous possible capacity for wind power in the Great Plains of the United States.  North 
Dakota in particular already produces about four percent of the United States’ electricity from wind power 
(US DOE, 2015) but has the theoretical potential, even after subtracting land that is unsuitable for energy 
development, of 770,000 megawatts (MW) which is a capacity higher than all the combined fossil-fueled 
power plants in the U.S. (NRDC, 2014).   However, with all of North Dakota’s wind potential, it ranks only 
11th in the U.S. for installed wind capacity (American Wind Energy Association, 2013).   
The Northern Great Plains (NGP) region has the environmental conditions conducive to biogas 
production of anaerobic digestion biomass feedstock from farm animal wastes as well as fuel crops (South 
Dakota State University, 2007).  Biogas recovery systems utilizing anaerobic digesters are estimated to be 
technically feasible at over 8200 dairy and swine operations in the United States.  Biogas recovery systems 
at these facilities have the potential to collectively generate over 13 million megawatt-hours (MWh) per year 
(AgSTAR, 2013).  However, from 2000 to 2015, the number of dairy farms in North Dakota has dropped 
from 350 to 91 (Farm Journal, 2015).  In the early 1990’s there were about 1600 dairy farms (Heinrich, 2012).   
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Based on the results of wind farms and AD facilities, significantly more energy and revenue can be 
generated per hectare of land using wind energy as opposed to AD.  However, by taking into consideration 
land use, land intensity and project economics, the integration of anaerobic digestion and wind energy can 
be used together to address both the economic and environmental challenges using renewable energy as a 
solution for North Dakota dairy farmers.  This integrated solution enables the higher benefit-to-cost ratio of 
wind to offset some of the cost challenges faced by dairy farmers and REAs.  Wind turbines placed on dairy 
farms could negate electricity costs associated with the farm and AD facility and provide another potential 
revenue stream for the farmers while producing biogas to be sold to the REAs.  Combining the smaller land 
occupational values of wind farms with the larger values for AD would provide an average land occupational 
value more conducive to profitability than AD alone.  Changes in North Dakota state legislature such as 
instituting mandatory RPS requirements instead of goals, feed-in tariffs, grants, subsidies or other forms of 
financial assistance similar to the state of Minnesota could provide the incentives to existing dairy farmers to 
implement such combinations of wind and AD projects.  These incentives could compensate for the 
associated capital costs while providing another renewable energy source to North Dakota’s portfolio while 
realizing the additional benefits of odor abatement, reduction in hazardous runoff and producing fertilizer 
and bedding material.  Changes to the state RPS may have a more favorable political impact to state citizens 
instead of the current path of the North Dakota state senate office, which is attempting to pass legislation to 
counter a 1932 anti-corporate farming law which was first instituted to protect family owned farms from 
corporately owned dairy farms (Associated Press, 2015).    
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CHAPTER 8:  INTRAPRENEURSHIP BUSINESS MODEL  
After the feasibility studies are complete, the next step is to develop a business model to demonstrate 
the financial viability of the integrated renewable energy solution as shown in Figure 35.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 35.  Intrapreneurship Business Model.   
 
 
 
8.1  Introduction 
 
The previous feasibility studies confirm that the Great Plains feedstock and wind energy abundance 
can provide an integrated renewable energy technology solution combining wind and anaerobic digestion 
utilizing animal waste feedstock.  This solution is viable for two main reasons: 
• Local power demand to a large entity such as a Rural Electrification District will be met. 
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• Excess power produced will be stored as syngas which will not burden the Grid and will 
capitalize on the natural variations in power demand and wind availability. 
Using the data from the feasibility studies, a business model has been developed to analyze the 
integrated solution optimizing both the wind energy and anaerobic digestion variables.  The outputs of the 
model will allow the intrapreneurs of this idea to determine the financial viability and better understand the 
economics and assist in financial decision making.  This information will be necessary when presenting the 
idea and solution to corporate senior leadership for a new venture. 
The business model will assist with determining if the integrated renewable energy solution can 
overcome the many technical challenges in supplementing conventional sources to supply a regional grid 
servicing distant markets reliably and economically.  The previous feasibilities have determined that in the 
High Plains of the United States, wind resources are fairly constant, but even so, the wind speed is not reliable 
enough to satisfy real-time local sales demand, unless excess capacity is installed, i.e., more turbines than 
required even for peak demand.  Moreover, in low wind, all units operate less efficiently.  However, where 
the cost of distributing power exceeds the cost of generation, as can occur in rural areas, renewables could 
be economical if the availability to meet demand was reliable.  This is generally the case if electricity is 
generated by combustion of local biofuels.  This integrated solution approach is to utilize both wind energy 
and anaerobic digestion (AD) such that excess power produced in high winds can be stored or used in other 
applications.   This stored energy can be used in processes that tolerate interruptible and variable supply such 
as the production of biogas from anaerobically digested dairy cow manure.  This will maintain local power 
supply reliability in periods of sparse wind and support export or local use as fuel.   
The biogas that is produced when AD exothermally converts feedstock using power from the excess 
wind energy exceeding demand in essence becomes energy storage.  Biogas is a clean environment friendly 
fuel containing about 55–65% methane (CH4), 30–45% carbon dioxide (CO2), traces of hydrogen sulfide 
(H2S) and fractions of water vapors.  Biogas can be utilized in internal combustion engines and turbines to 
produce electricity for both local distribution in low wind periods, and also to run AD stirrers and other 
equipment.  Heat from the engines and turbines can be used to produce hot water and maintain AD digester 
temperatures.  However, the presence of incombustible gases like CO2, H2S and water vapor reduce its 
calorific value and make it uneconomical to compress and transport long distances.  It is therefore necessary 
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to remove these components before compression, if the biogas will be exported (USDA, 2013).  The lower 
calorific value of biogas from AD is 23 MJ/Nm3 (Hallgran, 2009).  In high wind, the excess power can also 
be used to clean and desiccate the biogas, and remove the CO2 fraction.  An optimization analysis will be 
developed as part of the business model to determine how many wind and AD powered turbine-generators 
are needed to provide a particular level of reliability for a given pattern of demand intensity.   
For this business model, manure from dairy cows is used for the feedstock into the anaerobic 
digesters since manure is easily collected on dairy farms where cows are confined.  A 1,500 pound dairy cow 
produces about 125 pounds of manure daily (Abraham, 2002) and the Great Plains could produce over 60 
million cubic feet of biogas daily which is equivalent to 10 GWh of electricity.  AgSTAR estimates that there 
are now 202 anaerobic digester systems operating at commercial livestock farms in the United States while 
they are technically feasible at over 8200 farms in the United States (US EPA, 2013).  
  
8.2  Business Need for an Integrated System 
 
A business and technical solution consisting only of wind energy produces variable output that is 
dependent on the wind intensity and each wind turbine’s capacity factor.  Figure 36 illustrates a typical wind 
turbine’s power output based on wind speed (Pela Flow Consulting, N.D.). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36.  Typical Wind Turbine Power Output (Pela Flow Consulting, N.D.). 
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The rated capacity of a wind turbine is only achieved within a range of steady wind speeds between 
the rated output speed and cut-out speed.  The cut-out speed is the speed of the wind that can cause damage 
to the turbine so a braking system is employed to stop the rotor.   The cut-in speed is the speed of the wind 
where the wind turbine starts to rotate and generate electricity.  On average, wind turbines do not generate 
near their capacity.  Industry estimates project an annual output of 30-40%, but real-world experience shows 
that annual outputs of 15-30% of capacity are more typical (National Wind Watch, N.D.). 
If the energy solution is based solely on wind power, satisfaction of local demand will not be met 
unless excess capacity is installed which directly impacts the capital cost and return on investment of the 
project.  There will also be periods when wind energy is wasted when output exceeds demand.  These 
variabilities between demand and output, while currently a nuisance to grid operators, become a benefit of 
an integrated “hybrid” renewable energy solution.  Such a solution does not negatively impact the electrical 
grid transmission and distribution infrastructure.  To accomplish this, excess wind power that exceeds 
demand will be used to power anaerobic digesters.  The biogas that is produced from the anaerobic digesters 
powered by the excess wind energy exceeding demand in essence becomes energy storage. 
 
8.3  Integrated Renewable Energy Business Model 
 
There are currently 91 dairy farms throughout North Dakota (AgWeb, 2015).  Because dairy farm 
sizes vary drastically, the business model is designed for flexibility.  Anaerobic digesters have been proven 
to provide economic and environmental benefits on farms with as few as 100 dairy cows (Goodrich, 2005) 
as well as communal digesters serving multiple farms totaling over 15,000 cows (Cooper, 2012).   
The first step of the business model determines the power requirements for the anaerobic digester 
equipment.  For this example, we chose a 1000 milk cow dairy farm but the model is flexible to account for 
any size dairy farm.  The majority of required power is used by supplemental heat for the digesters due to the 
North Dakota environment.  Table 15 illustrates the major subsystems and the average power consumption 
for the 1000 cow anaerobic digester system.   
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Table 15.  Anaerobic  Digester System Power Consumption.   
Equipment kW Operational Hours/year MWh/year 
Submersible Mixer 35 4380a 153 
Agitator 10 8424b 84 
Supplemental Heat 240 6570c 1577 
Pumps (100 HP) 74 1095d 81 
Gas Cleaning and Handling 
Equipment 
70 7008e 491 
Gas Pressurization Equipment 30 7008e 210 
Total    2596 
a Based on half-time use per year (Renewable Energy Concepts, N.D.) 
b Based on full time use minus two weeks per year downtime for maintenance and servicing (Renewable 
Energy Concepts, N.D.). 
c Based on three-quarter use per year (Sustainable Conservation, 2014). 
d Based on pumps operating once every eight days (Electrigaz Technologies, 2008). 
e Based on equipment operating 80% full time (Electrigaz Technologies, 2008). 
 
 
 
The total electric power needed for the AD system is 2596 MWh/year.  On average, dairy farms use 
between 677 to 934 kWh per cow per year (TheCattleSite, 2014).  For this analysis, the midpoint electricity 
usage of 806 kWh per cow per year was chosen.  For the 1000 milk cow dairy farm, the average annual 
electricity consumed is 806 MWh/year.  Total electricity needed is therefore 3402 MWh/year.  The second 
step of the business model determines the minimum wind turbine size to provide the required power for the 
anaerobic digester system.  Additional wind turbines may be added as desired.  Table 16 shows the average 
yearly electricity generated by various sized wind turbines based on 8424 operational hours per year (14 days 
out of service per year for maintenance and service).  The North Dakota capacity factor for wind turbines is 
0.389 (US Energy Information Association, 2012).   
 
 
 
Table 16.  Average Electricity Generated in North Dakota by Various Sized Wind Turbines.   
 
Wind Turbine Nameplate Capacity 
Electricity 
Generation 
MWh/yeara 
500 kW 1638 
750 kW 2458 
1 MW 3277 
1.5 MW 4915 
2 MW 6554 
3 MW 9831 
 
 
 
The wind turbine that provides the closest electricity generation to power the AD system and dairy 
farm of 3402 MWh/year is the 1.5 MW turbine which generates 4915 MWh/year.  Excess power from the 
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1.5 MW wind turbine will also allow the project to power the farm house and other miscellaneous equipment 
potentially eliminating the owner’s electrical dependence from the local utility.  Depending on the utility and 
local legislation, the excess power could be sold back to the utility providing an additional revenue stream 
for the dairy farm. 
The third step of the business model determines the capital costs of the integrated renewable energy 
solution based on the sizes of equipment selected previously as detailed in Table 17. 
 
 
 
Table 17.  Integrated Renewable Energy Solution Capital Costs.   
 
a Capital Costs are based on the net present value of a regression of thirteen mixed digesters at $320,864 + 
$563 per cow (eXtension, 2014). 
b Solid Separator is based on 12% of the capital cost of the anaerobic digester project (eXtension, 2014). 
c Based on the net present value of Electrigaz Technologies feasibility study (Electrigaz Technologies, 
2008).  Due to the local gas grid connection, biogas storage systems are not necessary for this project. 
d Based on NRELwind turbine design cost and scaling model (Fingersh, 2006). 
eCivil work encompasses underground utility routing, grading, drainage, access roads, foundations, etc. 
fFor this example project, it is assumed that the maximum subsidies will be realized. 
 
 
 
To offset capital costs and incentivize renewable energy technologies, there are subsidies that are 
available that have the potential to compensate for a major portion of the initial capital.  There are up to 30% 
federal Treasury Department subsidies and up to an additional 25% subside from the USDA (Bennett, 2011).  
For this example project, grants in the amount of $1.5M could be realized, assuming that the maximum 
subsidies are awarded, which would reduce the capital costs to approximately $1.5M from $3.3M.   
Federal Subsidy (30%) 997,854$    
Capital Costa 974,757$     Rotor 313,993$    USDA Subsidy (25%) 831,545$    
Solid Separatorb 116,971$     Drive Train, Nacelle 817,441$    
Biogas Upgrade Equipmentc 332,676$     Control System 46,370$      
Gas Grid Connectionc 72,991$       Tower 194,755$    
Subtotal 1,497,395$  Foundation 60,944$      
Civil Worke 104,664$    
Transportation 66,243$      
Assembly & Installation 50,345$      
Electrical Interface & 
Connections 131,633$    
Engineering & Permitting 42,396$      
Subtotal 1,828,784$ 
3,326,179$ Total with subsidies 1,496,780$ 
Subsidiesf
1.5 MW Wind TurbinedAD System for 1000 Diary Cows
Capital Costs
Total without subsidies
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Revenue generated from the processed biogas will be approximately $70K to $75K per year based 
on 40K ft3 per day and 14.6 Mft3 per year being sold at a value of $5.03/kft3 (US EIA, 2012).  Electricity 
savings are on the order of $300K per year based on $0.0856/kWh (US EIA, 2010).  Other potential revenue 
sources not factored are the sale of animal bedding, liquid, and dry fertilizers that are natural by-products of 
the anaerobic digestion.  For this analysis, it is assumed that the additional revenue sources would offset the 
yearly operations and maintenance costs for both the wind turbine and anaerobic digester system. 
The output of the business model provides the estimated electricity savings by using wind to power 
the anaerobic digestion equipment, estimated electricity revenue from the surplus power generated from the 
wind turbine(s), revenue from biogas production, carbon credits, and finally, the expected payback period.  
AD facilities are eligible for carbon credits since they remove greenhouse gases from the environment.  A 
credit is a measure representing one megatonne (a mass equal to 1,000 kilograms) of carbon dioxide. This is 
either saved from being emitted or removed from the Earth's atmosphere (Wisler, 2015).  The price paid for 
carbon credits fluctuates in a dynamic market but in 2012, the price paid for each credit was $5.90 (Lang, 
2013).   
The output from our 1000 cow dairy farm example is shown in Table 18. 
 
 
 
Table 18.  Business Model Outputs.   
 
Estimated 
Electricity Savings 
($K/yr)a 
Estimated 
Electricity 
Revenue 
($K/yr)b 
Estimated 
Biogas 
Production 
Revenue 
($K/yr)c 
 
Carbon Credits 
($K/yr)d 
 
Payback Period 
(years) 
$222 $199 $73 $7 5 
a Based on the anaerobic digester equipment yearly power consumption multiplied by the average 
electricity rate in North Dakota of $0.0856/kWh (Otter Trail Power Company, 2014). 
b Based on the wind turbine(s) yearly output generation minus the AD yearly power consumption 
multiplied by the average electricity rate in North Dakota of $0.0856/kWh (Otter Trail Power Company, 
2014). 
c Based on the number of cows producing and average of 40 ft3/day sold at a value of $5.03/kft3 (US EIA, 
2012). 
d Based on removing 1100 megatonnes of carbon dioxide per year at $5.90 per credit (Lang, 2013). 
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8.4  Conclusion 
 
Based on the Great Plains of the United States’ abundant wind energy and biofuel feedstock supply, 
a renewable energy solution combining these plentiful resources could provide significant cost savings to the 
distribution cooperatives while increasing the reliability of the power contributors.  The business model 
developed can be tailored to the specific requirements of each dairy farm to determine the size of the wind 
turbine(s) needed to offset electricity costs while also estimating the quantity of syngas produced from the 
AD facility.  In our example of a 1000 milk cow dairy farm in North Dakota, we showed that one 1.5 MW 
wind turbine could be used to power the AD facility saving the dairy farm an estimated $200K per year in 
electricity costs while also providing a $200K yearly revenue stream via net metering to the local utility.  In 
addition, approximately $75K in revenue can be achieved from selling biogas which can be used as 
transportable fuel.  In essence this transportable fuel is the wind turbine(s) energy storage since the biogas 
can be transported and used to generate electricity via IC engines at different locations.  The environmental 
benefits of removing 1100 megatonnes of carbon dioxide produce about $7K per year in carbon credits.   
Thus, the payback period for the capital required for the integrated renewable energy solution is 
conservatively estimated to be 5 years for a 1000 cow dairy farm.  Unfortunately, North Dakota does not 
have anaerobic digestion production tax credits like states such as Minnesota or the payback period would 
be even less and revenue generation would be more. 
The business model and feasibility studies conclude that the intrapreneurs’ idea and solution is both 
technically and financially viable on both individual farm solutions and large scale multiple farm solutions.  
There is now sufficient information to proceed to corporate senior leadership and present the overall solution 
as shown in Figure 37.   
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Figure 37.  Business Models Showing Financial Viability and Feasibility Studies Showing Technical 
Viability Used to Present to Corporate Senior Leadership Prior to New Venture Approval. 
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CHAPTER 9: INTRAPRENEURSHIP RISK MANAGEMENT  
Before corporate leadership will authorize funding for a new venture, as shown in Figure 38, 
corporate leadership will need to understand the opportunities, risks and risk mitigations for the new venture. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 38.  Risk Management is an Integral Factor in Determining if a New Venture will be Approved by 
Corporate Leadership.   
 
 
 
9.1  Introduction 
 
Strategic planning for intrapreneurs involves incorporating a SWOT analysis which can help 
identify the likely risks and rewards.  SWOT stands for Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats, 
is an analytical framework that can help intrapreneurs face its greatest challenges and find its most promising 
new markets.  SWOT analysis was created in the 1960s by Edmund P. Learned, C. Roland Christensen, 
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Kenneth Andrews and William D. Book in their book "Business Policy, Text and Cases" (R.D. Irwin, 1969) 
-(Goodrich, 2015).   
SWOT's primary objective is to help organizations develop a full awareness of all the factors, 
positive and negative, that may affect strategic planning and decision-making. This goal can be applied to 
almost any aspect of industry.  SWOT is meant to be used during the proposal stage of strategic planning.  It 
acts as a precursor to any sort of company action, which makes it appropriate for the following moments: 
• Exploring avenues for new initiatives 
• Making decisions about execution strategies for a new policy 
• Identifying possible areas for change in a program 
• Refining and redirecting efforts midplan 
The SWOT analysis is an excellent tool for organizing information, presenting solutions, identifying 
roadblocks and emphasizing opportunities.  It is widely accepted and focuses on key issues affecting a 
company.  The purpose is to identify the strengths and weaknesses that are relevant to capitalizing on 
opportunities and mitigating threats.  The SWOT tool has 5 key benefits: 
• Simple to do and practical to use; 
• Clear to understand; 
• Focuses on the key internal and external factors affecting the company; 
• Helps to identify future goals; 
• Initiates further analysis (Jurevicius, 2013). 
Strengths and weaknesses are internal to the company and can be directly managed, while the 
opportunities and threats are external and the company can only anticipate and react to them.  When analyzing 
strengths, company assets that provide a competitive advantage are evaluated while weaknesses are listed as 
areas of focus for improvement where the company is lacking compared to the competition.   Strength and 
weakness analysis should include:   
• Resources such as land, equipment, knowledge, brand equity, intellectual property, etc. 
• Core competencies 
• Capabilities 
• Functional areas: management, operations, marketing, finances, human resources and R&D 
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• Organizational culture 
• Value chain activities (Jurevicius, 2013). 
The analysis should include clear definitions that are specific.  For example, “brand image” might 
be a weakness if the company has poor brand image.  However, it can also be a strength if the company has 
the most valuable brand in the market, valued at $100 billion.  Therefore, it is easier to identify if a factor is 
a strength or a weakness when it’s defined precisely. 
In addition to clear definitions, another key factor in doing a SWOT analysis is to identify the factors 
that are the strengths or weaknesses in comparison to the competition.  This is known as benchmarking.  For 
example, 17% profit margin would be an excellent margin for many firms in most industries and it would be 
considered as a strength. But what if the average profit margin of your competitors is 20%?  Then company’s 
17% profit margin would be considered as a weakness. 
A resource can be seen as a strength if it exhibits value; is rare; and cannot be imitated.  This is 
known as VRIO framework.  
Opportunities and threats are the external uncontrollable factors that usually appear or arise due to 
the changes in the macro environment, industry or competitors’ actions.  Opportunities represent the external 
situations that bring a competitive advantage if seized upon.  Threats may damage your company so you 
would better avoid or defend against them. 
A PESTEL (political, economic, social, technological, environmental and legal) analysis represents 
all the major external forces affecting the company so it’s the best place to look for the existing or new 
opportunities and threats. 
Competitor’s react to a company’s moves and external changes. They also change their existing 
strategies or introduce new ones.  Therefore, the company must always follow the actions of its competitors 
as new opportunities and threats may open at any time.  
The most visible opportunities and threats appear during the market changes. Markets converge, 
starting to satisfy other market segment needs with the same product. New geographical markets open up 
allowing the firm to increase its export volumes or start operations in a new country.  Often niche markets 
become profitable due to technological changes.  As a result, changes in the market create new opportunities 
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and threats that must be seized upon or dealt with if the company wants to gain and sustain competitive 
advantage. 
 
9.2  SWOT Template 
 
The following guidelines are very important in writing a successful SWOT analysis as they 
eliminate most of SWOT limitations and improve it's results significantly: 
• Factors have to be identified relative to the competitors. It allows specifying whether the factor 
is a strength or a weakness. 
• List between 3 – 5 items for each category. Prevents creating too short or endless lists. 
• Items must be clearly defined and as specific as possible. For example, firm’s strength is: brand 
image (vague); strong brand image (more precise); brand image valued at $10 billion, which is 
the most valued brand in the market (very good). 
• Rely on facts not opinions. Find some external information or involve someone who could 
provide an unbiased opinion. 
• Factors should be action orientated. For example, “slow introduction of new products” is action 
orientated weakness. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 39.  SWOT Template.   
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9.3  SWOT Example 
 
An IBM SWOT analysis from 2013 is used as an example (Jurivecius, 2013) as shown in Figure 40:   
 
 
Figure 40.  IBM SWOT Analysis Example.   
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Strengths: 
1. First mover in cloud computing solutions for enterprises. IBM has moved to cloud computing in 
2007 with its “Blue Cloud” program, which was designed to offer hardware and software solutions for 
enterprises that were willing to have their own private cloud. Since then the company has become the 
first reference point for enterprise cloud solutions in the cloud market. Unlike many other companies in 
the cloud market, the company has been offering the broadest range of software and services in one 
place. 
2. Brand reputation. IBM has a significant market reach all over the world in all of the markets it operates. 
Company has also been awarded as #1 company for leaders; #1 green company worldwide; #2 most 
respected company; #5 most admired company; and has received many more awards This has resulted 
in a very positive and strong brand reputation. According to Interbrand, IBM brand was value at $75.5 
billion in 2012 and was the 3rd most valuable brand in the world. Brand reputation significantly 
influences consumers’ decision to buy the product and IBM clearly benefits from that. 
3. Diversified business. IBM segments its business into 4 divisions: Hardware, Software, Services and 
Financing. In 2000, the company was earning 35% of its income from hardware sales, where profit 
margins are low and future market growth is slow or negative. IBM has diversified from hardware to 
software business, which is expected to generate 50% of company’s income by 2015. This shift will 
result in lower impact of the negative trends in hardware market and higher profitability from sales of 
software and services. The company has also diversified geographically and now earns more than 60% 
of its income from outside US. IBM heavily invests into China and the rest of Asia to increase the 
geographic diversity of its income. 
4. Strong competency in acquisitions. Over the last 13 years, from 2000 to 2012, IBM has acquired more 
than 140 companies in strategic areas including analytics, cloud, security and commerce. This has led to 
substantial growth in software and consulting offerings from IBM and established the company as a 
leading software and consulting provider for enterprises. IBM also expects to invest $20 billion over the 
next two years on acquisitions to strengthen its product portfolio even further. Company’s competence 
in successful acquisitions is the key advantage other companies, like HP, currently lack. 
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5. Integration of products and services. IBM offers hardware (servers, storages), software (enterprise 
content, service and information management) and services (cloud, software, data centers) all related to 
each other, which enable the company to provide one stop solution for enterprises and integrated product 
for the customers. 
Weaknesses: 
1. Expensive service and software solutions. IBM offers expensive integrated custom solutions for 
enterprises that want to build reliable IT infrastructure in their companies. This often involves buying 
hardware, software and services from IBM at the same time, which is very costly expenditure for any 
size of enterprise. Such an infrastructure investment is often postponed in times of uncertainty or slowing 
economy growth. This weakness was evident over the last few years, when IBM struggled to cross sell 
its products and saw decreasing revenues in the same period. 
2. Focus mainly on customized products. IBM focuses on providing customized solutions for large and 
medium enterprises. This is a very profitable business model but captures only a small share of the 
market. The rest of the market is often satisfied with off-the-shelf software products and services. The 
lack of these products makes IBM less approachable by the rest of the market, where competitors like 
Oracle and SalesForce thrive. 
Opportunities: 
1. Expand services and software divisions. IBM provides various services (cloud, security and 
infrastructure) and enterprise solutions (servers, networking and storage), which are the most profitable 
IBM’s businesses at the moment. The company should focus on growing these divisions as they promise 
better growth opportunities and higher profit margins. 
2. Increasing demand of cloud based services. The cloud computing market is expected to grow by an 
average of 22% each year from 2011 to 2020. By 2020, the market is expected to reach $240 billion 
value. Currently, IBM is offering many services related with cloud computing and is well positioned to 
benefit from the growing market. 
Threats: 
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1. Increasing competition in cloud computing market. Cloud computing market is new and lucrative 
market that has a lot of growth potential. The possible profits attract many newcomers and startups and 
threaten to take the market share from the incumbent IBM. 
2. Slowing growth of world economy. As mentioned earlier, IBM sales heavily depend on the enterprises’ 
willingness to make huge investments into IT infrastructure, which is far from the first option during the 
times of slow economy growth. While this scenario is not forecasted for the whole world during 2013 
and 2014, some regions, like Europe, will still struggle to grow. 
 
9.4  Intrapreneurship New Venture SWOT Analysis 
 
A SWOT analysis of the intrapreneurship new venture is shown in Figure 41 below: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 41.  Intrapreneurship New Venture SWOT Analysis.   
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Strengths: 
1. Corporate Research and Development Budget.  The Corporation recognizes the need for continuous 
research and development and provides a yearly budget for R&D activities.  In addition, the policies and 
procedures in place to request R&D funding allow for expanded opportunities as long as they are 
appropriately justified.  Many corporations that just provide services do not have the capability of 
research and development since they exclusively rely on customer funding from services contracts and 
projects.   
2. A&E and Manufacturing Skillsets.  Since the corporation provides architectural and engineering 
services as well as systems integration, subcontracts and manufacturing services, there exists an 
abundance of skillsets that are available to assist in the new venture.  Having diverse backgrounds from 
engineering, manufacturing, program management, subcontracts, etc. allows the project team to obtain 
full spectrum inputs throughout the project life cycle from inception thru execution.  Having 
manufacturing inputs during the early design phases allows the projects to implement a manufacturing 
and production perspective for potential solutions to multiple customers. 
3. Diversified business.  The Corporation has many business segments including Defense, Commercial, 
and Services.  The Corporation is also geographically diversified domestically and internationally.  
Geographical diversification provides advantages to knowledge of local policies, jurisdictions and 
procedures whereas business diversification provides advantages to the various types of contracts and 
customer basis. 
4. Integration of Products and Services.  The Corporation has focus on integrating the people, processes, 
and systems to increase collaboration and realize efficiency gains through the effective use of enterprise 
shared services and streamlined policies.  The integration of corporate products and services should act 
as a catalyst to new venture start-ups due to increased collaboration and efficiency gains.   
Weaknesses: 
1. Department of Defense Corporate Culture.   Because the majority of the Corporation’s projects have 
been large Department of Defense (DOD) Contracts, the Corporation’s culture, policies and procedures 
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have been structured around DOD policies, procedures and culture.  In executing such projects 
throughout the history of the Corporation, most of the core staff, including engineers, program managers, 
financial analysts, etc.,  have built their careers based on DOD projects and experiences.  Diversifying 
the corporate portfolio to include contracts other than from the Department of Defense, will include 
shifting the corporate culture from a DOD standards to a more competitive and stream-lined commercial 
culture.  The weakness is the corporate comfort zone with a DOD culture that would deter the 
competitiveness of a commercial project initiative.       
2. Large project focus.  As with the DOD corporate culture, the mainstay of the corporation has been 
large, long-term projects.  New ventures require quick, accurate, and stream-lined engineering and 
design processes with optimum staffing to implement projects while providing the Corporation with a 
competitive advantage.  The “norm” will be small, fast-paced engineering solutions with a core team of 
discipline experts as opposed to the layers of manpower typical within a DOD structure. 
3. Expensive overhead and rate structure.  To be competitive while providing customer solutions, a 
modified rate structure will need to be developed as the rate structures typical for DOD projects will not 
be marketable.  Modifying rate structures will need to be approved at a senior leadership level within the 
Corporation and will involve Human Resources, business sector leaders and senior managers.  
Considerations may also include a new venture sub division with a different compensation and benefit 
structure which could cause internal conflict between new ventures employees and mainstream corporate 
employees.   
Opportunities: 
1. Increased demand to expand the corporate portfolio.  With DOD budgets shrinking on an annual 
basis and government funding in various states of uncertainty, the Corporation has recognized and 
socialized the need to expand into non-traditional markets.   As such, business strategies branching into 
commercial sectors and/or using a more commercialized approach for government solutions are being 
explored to both broaden the Corporation’s core businesses and streamlining traditional policies and 
procedures to become more competitive.  Thus, the timing of a new venture is very opportunistic as it 
aligns with the current corporate business strategy of expanding the business portfolio.    
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2. Expansion of Renewable Portfolio Standards.  With twenty-nine states and Washington, D.C. now 
having renewable portfolio standards (RPS) or alternative energy portfolio standards (AEPS) which 
require a certain percentage of a utility’s power plant capacity or generation to come from renewable or 
alternative energy sources by a given date, a new venture providing a viable renewable energy solution 
aligns with state requirements.   
3. “Go-Green” Political Pressure.  Political pressure to “go-green” is now global as there exists a rising 
awareness that renewable energy and energy efficiency are critical for not only addressing climate 
change, but also creating new economic opportunities and for providing energy access to the billions of 
people still living without modern energy services (REN21, 2015).   
Threats: 
1. Increasing competition in the renewable energy market.  The renewable energy market is lucrative 
and continues to grow. The possible profits attract many newcomers and startups and threaten to take 
market share from the Corporation. 
2. Slowing growth of world economy.   The Corporation’s sales heavily depend on investments into a 
new venture during times of slow economy growth which can have in impact on existing sales, forecasts 
and investments. 
3. Cancellation of subsidies.  Subsidies greatly impact compensation for capital investment and, return on 
investment, payback period and as such, competition with non-renewable solutions.  Cancelling 
subsidies currently offered on the federal and state levels could pose a crippling effect on the financial 
viability of integrated renewable energy solutions.  
 
9.5  Using SWOT Analysis Results to Develop a Business Strategy 
 
The order in which business strategists think about strengths, weaknesses, threats and opportunities 
may have an impact on the direction of the analysis.  Michael Watkins of the "Harvard Business Review" 
says that focusing on threats and opportunities first helps lead to productive discussions about what is going 
on in the external environment rather than getting bogged down in abstract discussions about what a company 
is good at or bad at (Hamel, 2015). 
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The results of the SWOT analysis helps determine: 
• Making the most of the strengths 
• Mitigating the weaknesses 
• Capitalize on opportunities 
• Manage the threats 
By focusing on threats and opportunities first, the threat analysis helps the new venture to strategize 
mitigate the threats that could be negative growth and success factors.  In our analysis the threats of increasing 
competition in the renewable energy market and a slowing global economy will be mitigated by focusing on 
renewable energy solutions that are proven in theory but have not yet developed a pilot program.  By using 
our strengths of having a corporate research and development budget, experience with integration of products 
and services as well as architectural and engineering and manufacturing expertise, our new venture is in the 
unique position to help develop pilot programs of new technologies.  This virtually eliminates the threats 
from start-up companies and engineering and design firms since they typically do not have a R&D budget as 
they rely on customer funding for all services. 
The new venture also monopolizes on the opportunities to expand the corporate portfolio while 
utilizing current “go-green” political pressures as well as expanding renewable portfolio standards.   
To overcome weaknesses, the new venture will be managed by an experienced senior leader who is 
well networked within the corporation.  The new venture will be measured by a streamlined set of policies 
and procedures that are tailored for the new venture market while still maintaining alignment within the 
corporation.  Progress will be closely monitored based on defined milestones for the new venture and not 
based on the same financial merits of the new venture’s core line of business. 
 
9.5  Conclusion 
 
No business is a sure thing, but much of the uncertainty can be resolved through analysis of three of 
its sources: the market, the operational model, and the financial model. Market risk is a result of many 
factors, including whether the market is large enough to support the business, whether the market is growing, 
what trends exist in the industry, how the competition is structured, and how distribution works.  The issue 
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of market size is also important in feasibility analysis (Ebben, 2005).  The SWOT analysis captured these 
risks and the resulting business strategy provided the market focus.   
Operational risk deals with whether the business can set up internally to deliver goods and services 
to customers effectively.  Operational risk will also include logistical issues with delivery and returns and 
effective use of service staff.  The new venture’s ability to execute internally and keep costs under control 
will be essential to business success. 
Financial model risk refers to the risk that the new venture won't work due to the numbers.  For any 
new venture, financial projections through modelling should be generated to understand where breakeven 
will occur and what will drive the business financially (Ebben, 2005). 
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CHAPTER 10: INTRAPRENEURSHIP NEW VENTURE  
Figure 42 illustrates the intrapreneuring process once the new venture has been 
approved by corporate leadership.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 42.  Intrapreneurship New Venture Process.   
 
 
 
Once the new venture funding has been approved by the corporation, the new venture will be 
established with the group of intrapreneurs.  While the new venture intrapreneural team work the solution 
(step 14) through design maturation, periodic meetings with corporate leadership (step 15) will occur to 
ensure progress and that the new venture team is receiving the proper funding, resources, guidance, and 
expertise are available for success.  During these corporate meetings, senior leadership will assess new 
venture metrics and determine if the new venture is on a potential path to success or if unexpected 
circumstances warrant the new venture to be terminated (steps 16 and 17).  The success of the new venture 
is based on long term goals not short term gains.  As Wendell Weeks CEO of Corning stated, “We must 
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recognize that the greatest value often comes from our longer-term bets.”  (Weeks, 2016).  The design and 
solution maturation continue with the periodic corporate meetings until the new venture is profitable and 
worthy to become an integrated solution silo added to the corporate portfolio (step 18).   
The Intrapreneurship New Venture Process is designed to work within all corporate frameworks.  
The size of the corporation is inconsequential to the process as the steps involving corporate decision gates 
will be tailored by the specific corporation implementing this process.   
Future work to further develop the Intrapreneurship New Venture Process involves research 
incorporating multiple viable new ventures simultaneously while balancing corporate resources and 
expenditures. 
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Appendix A  Tabulated Wind Farm Data by State (Denholme, 2009)  
 
 
 
Table 19.  Tabulated Wind Farm Data by State (Denholme, 2009). 
 
 
Total Area Per
No. Of Capacity Total Area Unit Capacity
Name State Turbines MW (hectares) Hectares/MW
Bluegrass Ridge MO 27 57 2835.0. 50
Conception Wind Farm MO 24 50 2835.0. 56.25
Cow Brance MO 24 50 2835.0. 56.25
Langdon Wind ND 106 159 12312 77.34
North Dakota Wind ND 41 62 1215 19.76
Tatanka Wind Farm ND 120 180 5702.4 31.68
Wilton Wind Energy ND 33 50 3240 65.45
Ashtabula Wind Center II ND 133 200 19958.4 99.79
MinnDakota Wind Farm II SD 36 54 1608.1 29.78
South Dakota Wind Energy SD 27 41 1012.5 25
Wessington Springs SD 66 99 2430 24.55
White Wind Farm SD 103 200 7257.6 36.29
Buffalo Ridge Wind Farm SD 204 306 20032.5 65.47
Foote Creek 1 WY 69 41 846.5 20.45
Glenrock Wind Energy WY 66 99 5670 57.27
Seven Mile Hill WY 66 99 4050 40.91
Ainsworth Wind Energy NE 36 59 4455 75
Elkhorn Ridge NE 27 80 3383.8 42.35
Cedar Creek Wind Farm CO 274 300 15390 51.3
Cedar Point CO 150 300 8100 27
Colorado Green CO 108 162 4795.2 29.6
Spring Canyon CO 87 130 8931.9 68.71
Twin Buttes Wind Power CO 50 75 3645 48.6
Central Plains Wind Farm KS 33 99 2430 24.55
Elk River KS 100 150 3202.3 21.35
Flat Ridge Wind Farm KS 40 100 2025 20.25
Gray County Wind Farm KS 170 112 2430 21.7
Meridian Way Wind Farm KS 79 201 8100 40.3
Smoky Hills Wind Farm 1 KS 56 101 4050 40.18
Spearville KS 67 101 2025 20.15
Smoky Hills Wind Farm II KS 99 1449 5670 38.18
Blue Canyon Wind Power OK 129 225 6480 28.74
OK Wind Energy Center A OK 68 102 486 4.76
Weatherford Wind OK 98 147 2106 14.33
Red Hills Wind Farm OK 82 123 2025 16.46
Aragonne Wind LLC NM 90 90 3888 43.2
New Mexico Wind NM 136 204 3888 19.06
San Juan Mesa NM 120 120 1749.6 14.58
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Table 19 (continued) 
 
  
Brazos Wind Ranch TX 160 160 7776 48.6
Callahan Divide TX 76 114 2430 21.32
Champion Wind Farm TX 55 127 5670 44.82
Desret Sky TX 107 161 3888 24.22
Elbow Creek Wind TX 53 122 2713.5 22.26
Forest Creek Wind TX 54 124 6075 48.91
Goat Mountain  Wind 
Ranch TX 109 150 4252.5 28.35
Horse Hollow Wind 
Energy Center TX 419 733 19035 25.99
King Mountain I & II TX 214 278 6075 21.84
Liano Estacado Wind 
Ranch TX 80 80 2332.8 29.16
Lone Star Phase I TX 200 400 8100 20.25
Lone Star Phase II TX 100 200 15460.9 77.3
Penascal Wind Farm TX 87 202 6075 30.07
Red Canyon Wind Energy TX 56 84 3847.5 45.8
Roscoe Wind Farm TX 627 782 28350 36.28
Sherbino I Wind Farm TX 50 150 4050 27
Silver Star I Wind Farm TX 24 60 3057.8 50.96
Stanton Wind Farm TX 80 120 6885 57.38
Sweetwater Phase IV - 
Mistsubishi Portion TX 135 135 4860 36
Sweetwater Phase IV - 
Siemens Portion TX 46 106 4860 45.94
Trent Mesa TX 100 150 3628.8 24.19
Wildorado Wind Ranch TX 70 161 6480 40.25
Woodward Mountain I & II TX 242 160 3785.1 23.66
Bull Creek Wind Farm TX 180 180 24300 135
Panther Creek Wind Farm TX 111 167 9315 55.95
Wolf Ridge Wind Farm TX 75 113 4131 36.72
Ocotillo TX 28 59 1012.5 17.22
Gulf Winds Project TX 118 283 3179.7 11.23
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Appendix B  North Dakota Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 43.  North Dakota Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
 
 
 
Table 20.  North Dakota 2012 Ranked Items Within the US Census State Profile (USDA, 2015). 
Item Quantity U.S. Rank 
  
TOP CROP ITEMS (acres) 
Wheat for grain, all 7,767,484 2 
Spring wheat for grain 5,708,405 1 
Soybeans for beans 4,729,137 7 
Corn for grain 3,465,997 9 
Forage-land used for all hay and haylage, grass silage, and 
greenchop 2,172,738 9 
  
TOP LIVESTOCK INVENTORY ITEMS (number) 
Cattle and calves 1,809,613 16 
Turkeys 419,319 19 
Colonies of bees 370,480 2 
Hogs and pigs 133,653 27 
Layers 92,754 45 
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Appendix C  South Dakota Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 44.  South Dakota Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
 
 
 
 
Table 21.  South Dakota 2012 Ranked Items Within the US Census State Profile (USDA, 2015). 
Item Quantity U.S. Rank 
  
TOP CROP ITEMS (acres) 
Corn for grain 5,289,110 6 
Soybeans for beans 4,714,204 8 
Forage-land used for all hay and haylage, grass silage, and 
greenchop 2,615,189 4 
Wheat for grain, all 2,203,785 6 
Winter wheat for grain 1,208,309 8 
  
TOP LIVESTOCK INVENTORY ITEMS (number) 
Cattle and calves 3,893,251 7 
Layers 2,450,780 29 
Turkeys 2,449,784 13 
Hogs and pigs 1,191,162 11 
Pullets for laying flock replacement (D) 30 
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Appendix D  Montana Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 45.  Montana Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
 
 
 
Table 22.  Montana 2012 Ranked Items Within the US Census State Profile (USDA, 2015). 
Item Quantity U.S. Rank 
  
TOP CROP ITEMS (acres) 
Wheat for grain, all 5,627,463 3 
Spring wheat for grain 2,909,910 2 
Forage-land used for all hay and haylage, grass silage, and 
greenchop 2,267,198 8 
Winter wheat for grain 2,168,021 4 
Barley for grain 778,521 2 
  
TOP LIVESTOCK INVENTORY ITEMS (number) 
Cattle and calves 2,633,740 10 
Layers 464,802 40 
Sheep and lambs 236,646 7 
Pullets for laying flock replacement 225,021 38 
Hogs and pigs 173,953 22 
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Appendix E  Wyoming Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 46.  Wyoming Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
 
 
 
Table 23.  Wyoming 2012 Ranked Items Within the US Census State Profile (USDA, 2015). 
Item Quantity U.S. Rank 
  
TOP CROP ITEMS (acres) 
Forage-land used for all hay and haylage, grass silage, and 
greenchop 1,053,646 22 
Wheat for grain, all 131,905 33 
Winter wheat for grain 120,113 32 
Barley for grain 62,590 7 
Corn for grain 60,349 35 
  
TOP LIVESTOCK INVENTORY ITEMS (number) 
Cattle and calves 1,307,731 23 
Sheep and lambs 354,785 4 
Hogs and pigs 85,432 30 
Horses and ponies 72,461 19 
Colonies of bees 45,029 16 
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Appendix F  Nebraska Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 47.  Nebraska Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
 
 
 
Table 24.  Nebraska 2012 Ranked Items Within the US Census State Profile (USDA, 2015). 
Item Quantity U.S. Rank 
  
TOP CROP ITEMS (acres) 
Corn for grain 9,087,851 3 
Soybeans for beans 4,983,253 6 
Forage-land used for all hay and haylage, grass silage, and 
greenchop 2,487,312 5 
Wheat for grain, all 1,309,269 10 
Winter wheat for grain 1,302,674 7 
  
TOP LIVESTOCK INVENTORY ITEMS (number) 
Layers 9,351,688 14 
Cattle and calves 6,385,675 2 
Hogs and pigs 2,992,576 6 
Pullets for laying flock replacement 2,579,664 15 
Broilers and other meat-type chickens 908,965 28 
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Appendix G  Colorado Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 48.  Colorado Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
 
 
 
Table 25.  Colorado 2012 Ranked Items Within the US Census State Profile (USDA, 2015). 
Item Quantity U.S. Rank 
  
TOP CROP ITEMS (acres) 
Wheat for grain, all 2,181,967 8 
Winter wheat for grain 2,167,930 5 
Forage-land used for all hay and haylage, grass silage, and 
greenchop 1,296,617 18 
Corn for grain 1,011,151 15 
Corn for silage 157,285 15 
  
TOP LIVESTOCK INVENTORY ITEMS (number) 
Layers 4,195,691 23 
Cattle and calves 2,630,082 11 
Pullets for laying flock replacement 881,505 26 
Hogs and pigs 727,301 16 
Sheep and lambs 401,376 3 
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Appendix H  Kansas Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 49.  Kansas Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
 
 
 
Table 26.  Kansas 2012 Ranked Items Within the US Census State Profile (USDA, 2015). 
Item Quantity U.S. Rank 
  
TOP CROP ITEMS (acres) 
Wheat for grain, all 9,009,535 1 
Winter wheat for grain 9,009,535 1 
Corn for grain 3,948,462 7 
Soybeans for beans 3,802,588 10 
Forage-land used for all hay and haylage, grass silage, and 
greenchop 2,468,996 6 
  
TOP LIVESTOCK INVENTORY ITEMS (number) 
Cattle and calves 5,922,187 3 
Hogs and pigs 1,886,197 10 
Layers (D) 35 
Pullets for laying flock replacement (D) 36 
Pheasants 246,132 4 
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Appendix I  Oklahoma Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 50.  Oklahoma Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
 
 
( 
Table 27.  Oklahoma 2012 Ranked Items Within the US Census State Profile (USDA, 2015). 
Item Quantity U.S. Rank 
  
TOP CROP ITEMS (acres) 
Wheat for grain, all 4,291,939 4 
Winter wheat for grain 4,291,939 2 
Forage-land used for all hay and haylage, grass silage, and 
greenchop 2,705,150 3 
Corn for grain 294,133 27 
Soybeans for beans 259,921 25 
  
TOP LIVESTOCK INVENTORY ITEMS (number) 
Broilers and other meat-type chickens 38,429,952 13 
Cattle and calves 4,245,970 5 
Layers 3,121,799 26 
Hogs and pigs 2,304,740 8 
Pullets for laying flock replacement 1,540,444 20 
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Appendix J  New Mexico Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 51.  New Mexico Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
 
 
 
Table 28.  New Mexico 2012 Ranked Items Within the US Census State Profile (USDA, 2015). 
Item Quantity U.S. Rank 
  
TOP CROP ITEMS (acres) 
Forage-land used for all hay and haylage, grass silage, and 
greenchop 343,032 37 
Wheat for grain, all 87,504 35 
Winter wheat for grain 86,434 33 
Corn for silage 81,866 22 
Pecans, all 41,331 4 
  
TOP LIVESTOCK INVENTORY ITEMS (number) 
Cattle and calves 1,354,240 22 
Sheep and lambs 89,745 17 
Layers 66,653 47 
Horses and ponies 50,723 36 
Goats, all 30,981 26 
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Appendix K  Texas Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 52.  Texas Agriculture Overview (USDA, 2015). 
 
 
 
Table 29.  Texas 2012 Ranked Items Within the US Census State Profile (USDA, 2015). 
Item Quantity U.S. Rank 
  
TOP CROP ITEMS (acres) 
Forage-land used for all hay and haylage, grass silage, and 
greenchop 5,069,579 1 
Cotton, all 3,844,464 1 
Upland cotton 3,835,216 1 
Wheat for grain, all 2,993,969 5 
Winter wheat for grain 2,989,113 3 
  
TOP LIVESTOCK INVENTORY ITEMS (number) 
Broilers and other meat-type chickens 107,351,698 6 
Layers 20,902,244 5 
Cattle and calves 11,159,747 1 
Pullets for laying flock replacement 6,244,474 7 
Turkeys 1,747,526 17 
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Appendix L  Langdon Wind Farm 
 
 
 
 
Figure 53.  Langdon Wind Farm Overview.   
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Figure 54.  Langdon Wind Farm with defined measurement areas.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 55.  Langdon Wind Farm Access Roads 
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Figure 56.  Langdon Wind Farm Area 1.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 57.  Langdon Wind Farm Area 2.   
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Figure 58.  Langdon Wind Farm Area 3.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 59.  Langdon Wind Farm Area 4.   
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Figure 60.  Langdon Wind Farm Area 5.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 61.  Langdon Wind Farm Area 6.   
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Figure 62.  Langdon Wind Farm Area 7.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 63.  Langdon Wind Farm Area 8.   
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Figure 64.  Langdon Wind Farm Area 9.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 65.  Langdon Wind Farm Area 10.   
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Figure 66.  Langdon Wind Farm Area 11.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 67.  Langdon Wind Farm Area 12.   
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Figure 68.  Langdon Wind Farm Area 13.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 69.  Langdon Wind Farm Area 14.   
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Figure 70.  Langdon Wind Farm Area 15.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 71.  Langdon Wind Farm Area 16.   
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Figure 72.  Langdon Wind Farm Area 17.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 73.  Langdon Wind Farm Area 18.   
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Figure 74.  Langdon Wind Farm Area 19.   
 
 
 
Table 30.  Langdon Wind Farm Summary. 
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Appendix M  North Dakota Wind Energy (North Dakota I and II)  Wind  Farm 
 
 
 
 
Figure 75.  North Dakota Wind Farm Overview.   
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Figure 76.  North Dakota Wind Farm with Defined Measurement Areas.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 77.  North Dakota Wind Farm Access Roads.   
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Figure 78.  North Dakota Wind Farm Area 1.   
 
Figure 79.  North Dakota Wind Farm Substation.   
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Figure 80.  North Dakota Wind Farm Area 2.   
   
 
 
 
Figure 81.  North Dakota Wind Farm Area 3.   
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Figure 82.  North Dakota Wind Farm Area 4.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 83.  North Dakota Wind Farm Area 5.   
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Figure 84.  North Dakota Wind Farm Area 6.   
 
 
 
Table 31.  North Dakota Wind Farm Summary. 
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Appendix N  Tatanka Wind Farm  
 
 
 
 
Figure 85.  Tatanka Wind Farm Overview.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 86.  Tatanka Wind Fam with Defined Measurement Areas.   
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Figure 87.  Tatanka Wind Farm Access Roads.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 88.  Tatanka Wind Farm Area 1.   
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Figure 89.  Tatanka Wind Farm Area 2.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 90.  Tatanka Wind Farm Area 3.   
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Figure 91.  Tatanka Wind Farm Area 4.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 92.  Tatanka Wind Farm Area 5.   
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Table 32.  Tatanka Wind Farm Summary. 
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Appendix O  Ashtabula I Wind Farm  
 
 
 
 
Figure 93.  Ashtabula I Wind Farm Overview. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 94.  Ashtabula I Wind Farm with Defined Measurement Areas.   
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Figure 95.  Ashtabula I Wind Farm Access Roads.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 96.  Ashtabula I Wind Farm Area 1.   
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Figure 97.  Ashtabula Wind Farm Area 2.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 98.  Ashtabula I Wind Farm Area 3.   
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Figure 99.  Ashtabula I Wind Farm Area 4.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 100.  Ashtabula I Wind Farm Area 5.   
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Figure 101.  Ashtabula I Wind Farm Area 6.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 102.  Ashtabula I Wind Farm Area 7.   
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Figure 103.  Ashtabula I Wind Farm Area 8.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 104.  Ashtabula I  Wind Farm Area 9.   
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Figure 105.  Ashtabula I Wind Farm Substation.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 106.  Ashtabula I Wind Farm Area 10.   
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Figure 107.  Ashtabula I Wind Farm Area 11.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 108.  Ashtabula I Wind Farm Area 12.   
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Figure 109.  Ashtabula I Wind Farm Area 13.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 110.  Ashtabula Wind Farm Area 14.   
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Figure 111.  Ashtabula I Wind Farm Area 15.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 112.  Ashtabula I Wind Farm Area 16.   
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Figure 113.  Ashtabula I Wind Farm Area 17.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 114.  Ashtabula I Wind Farm Area 18.   
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Table 33.  Ashtabula I Wind Farm Summary 
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Appendix P  Ashtabula II Wind Farm  
 
 
 
Ashtabula II (Also Known As Luverne South Field) Wind Farm 
 
Figure 115.  Ashtabula II Wind Farm Defined Measurement Areas 
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Figure 116.  Ashtabula II Wind Farm Defined Measurement Areas.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 117.  Ashtabula II Wind Farm Access Roads.   
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Figure 118.  Ashtabula II Wind Farm Area 1.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 119.  Ashtabula II Wind Farm Area 2.   
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Figure 120.  Ashtabula II Wind Farm Areas 3 and 4 
 
 
 
 
Figure 121.  Ashtabula II Wind Farm Areas 5 and 6.   
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Figure 122.  Ashtabula II Wind Farm Areas 7 and 8.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 123.  Ashtabula II Wind Farm Areas 9 and 10.   
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Figure 124.  Ashtabula II Wind Farms Areas 11 and 12.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 125.  Ashtabula II Wind Farm Areas 13 and 14.   
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Figure 126.  Ashtabula II Wind Farm Areas 15 and 16.   
 
 
 
Table 34.  Ashtabula II Wind Farm Summary. 
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Appendix Q  Ashtabula III Wind Farm  
 
 
 
Ashtabula III Wind Farm 
 
Figure 127.  Ashtabula III Wind Farm Overview.   
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Figure 128.  Ashtabula III Wind Farm with Defined Measurement Areas.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 129.  Ashtabula III Wind Farm Access Roads.   
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Figure 130.  Ashtabula III Wind Farm Area 1.   
 
Figure 131.  Ashtabula III Wind Farm Area 2.   
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Figure 132.  Ashtabula III Wind Farm Area 3.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 133.  Ashtabula III Wind Farm Area 4.   
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Figure 134.  Ashtabula III Wind Farm Area 5.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 135.  Ashtabula III Wind Farm Area 6.   
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Table 35.  Ashtabula III Wind Farm Summary. 
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Appendix R  Bison Wind Farm  
 
 
 
Bison Wind Farm 
 
 
Figure 136.  Bison Wind Farm Overview.   
 
Figure 137.  Bison Wind Farm with Defined Measurement Areas 
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Figure 138.  Bison Wind Farm Access Roads 
 
 
 
Figure 139.  Bison Wind Farm Area 1.   
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Figure 140.  Bison Wind Farm Area 2.   
 
Figure 141.  Bison Wind Farm Area 3.   
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Figure 142.  Bison Wind Farm Substation.   
 
Figure 143.  Bison Wind Farm Area 4.   
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Figure 144.  Bison Wind Farm Area 5.   
 
Figure 145.  Bison Wind Far Area 6.   
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Figure 146.  Bison Wind Farm Area 7,   
 
Figure 147.  Bison Wind Farm Area 8.   
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Figure 148.  Bison Wind Farm Area 9.   
 
Figure 149.  Bison Wind Farm Area 10.   
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Figure 150.  Bison Wind Farm Area 11.   
 
Figure 151.  Bison Wind Farm Area 12.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
193 
Table 36.  Bison Wind Farm Summary. 
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Appendix S  Rugby Wind Farm  
 
 
 
 
Figure 152.  Rugby Wind Farm Overview 
 
 
 
 
Figure 153.  Rugby Wind Far with Defined Measurement Areas.   
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Figure 154.  Rugby Wind Farm Access Roads.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 155.  Rugby Wind Farm Area 1.   
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Figure 156.  Rugby Wind Farm Area 2.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 157.  Rugby Wind Farm Area 3.   
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Figure 158.  Rugby Wind Farm Area 4.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 159.  Rugby Wind Far Area 5.   
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Figure 160.  Rugby Wind Farm Area 6.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 161.  Rugby Wind Farm Area 7.   
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Figure 162.  Rugby Wind Farm Area 8.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 163.  Rugby Wind Farm Area 9.   
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Table 37.  Rugby Wind Farm Summary. 
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Appendix T  Prairie Winds Wind Farm  
 
 
 
 
Figure 164.   Prairie Winds Wind Farm Overview.   
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Figure 165.  Prairie Winds Wind Farm with Defined Measurement Areas.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 166.  Prairie Winds Wind Farm Access Roads.   
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Figure 167.  Prairie Winds Wind Farm Area 1.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 168.  Prairie Winds Wind Farm Area 2.   
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Figure 169.  Prairie Winds Wind Farm Area 3.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 170.  Prairie Winds Wind Farm Substation.   
205 
 
Figure 171.  Prairie Winds Wind Farm Area 4.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 172.  Prairie Winds Wind Farm Area 5.   
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Figure 173.  Prairie Winds Wind Farm Area 6.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 174.  Prairie Winds Wind Farn Area 7.   
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Figure 175.  Prairie Winds Wind Farm Area 8.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 176.  Prairie Winds Wind Farm Area 9.   
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Figure 177.  Prairie Winds Wind Farm Area 10. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 178.  Prairie Winds Wind Farm Area 11.   
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Figure 179.  Prairie Winds Wind Farm Area 12.   
 
 
 
Table 38.  Prairie Winds Wind Farm Summary. 
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Appendix U  Baldwin Wind Farm  
 
 
 
 
Figure 180.  Baldwin Wind Farm Overview.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 181.  Baldwin Wind Farm with Defined Measurement Areas.   
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Figure 182.  Baldwin Wind Farm Access Roads.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 183.  Baldwin Wind Farm Area 1.   
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Figure 184.  Baldwin Wind Farm Area 2.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 185.  Baldwin Wind Farm Area 3.   
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Figure 186.  Baldwin Wind Farm Substation.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 187.  Baldwin Wind Farm Area 4.   
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Figure 188.  Baldwin Wind Farm Area 5.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 189.  Baldwin Wind Farm Area 6.   
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Figure 190.  Baldwin Wind Farm Area 7.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 191.  Baldwin Wind Farm Area 8.   
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Figure 192.  Baldwin Wind Farm Area 9.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 193.  Baldwin Wind Farm Area 10.   
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Figure 194.  Baldwin Wind Farm Area 11.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 195.  Baldwin Wind Farm Area 12.   
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Figure 196.  Baldwin Wind Farm Area 13.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 197.  Baldwin Wind Farm Area 14.   
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Table 39.  Baldwin Wind Farm Summary 
 
  
220 
Appendix V  Oliver Wind Energy I Wind Farm  
 
 
 
 
Figure 198.  Olive Wind Energy I Wind Farm Overview.   
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Figure 199.  Oliver Wind Energy I Wind Farm with Defined Measurement Areas.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 200.  Oliver Wind Energy I Wind Farm Access Roads.   
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Figure 201.  Oliver Wind Energy I Wind Farm Area 1.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 202.  Oliver Wind Energy I Wind Farm Area 2 
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Figure 203.  Oliver Wind Energy I Wind Farm Area 3.   
 
 
 
Table 40.  Oliver Wind Energy I Wind Farm Summary. 
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Appendix W  Oliver Wind Energy II Wind Farm  
 
 
 
 
Figure 204.  Oliver Wind Energy II Wind Farm Overview.   
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Figure 205.  Oliver Wind Energy II Wind Farm with Defined Measurement Areas.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 206.  Oliver Wind Energy II Wind Farm Access Roads.   
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Figure 207.  Oliver Wind Energy II Wind Farm Area 1.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 208.  Oliver Wind Energy II Wind Farm Area 2.   
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Table 41.  Oliver Wind Energy II Wind Farm Summary. 
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Appendix X  Luverne North Wind Farm  
 
 
 
 
Figure 209.  Luverne North Wind Farm Overview.   
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Figure 210.  Luverne North Wind Farm with Defined Measurement Areas 
 
 
 
 
Figure 211.  Luverne North Wind Farm Access Roads.   
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Figure 212.  Luverne North Wind Farm Access 1.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 213.  Luverne North Wind Farm Area 2.   
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Figure 214.  Luverne North Wind Farm Area 3.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 215.  Luverne North Wind Farm Area 4.   
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Figure 216.  Luverne North Wind Farm Area 5.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 217.  Luverne North Wind Farm Substation.   
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Figure 218.  Luverne North Wind Farm Area 6.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 219.  Luverne North Wind Farm Areas 7 and 8.   
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Figure 220.  Luverne North Wind Farm Area 9.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 221.  Luverne North Wind Farm Area 10.   
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Table 42.  Luverne North Wind Farm Summary. 
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Appendix Y  Cedar Hills Wind Farm  
 
 
 
 
Figure 222.  Cedar Hills Wind Farm Overview.   
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Figure 223.  Cedar Hills Wind Farm with Defined Measurement Areas.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 224.  Cedar Hills Wind Farm Access Roads.   
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Figure 225.  Cedar Hills Wind Farm Area 1.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 226.  Cedar Hills Wind Farm Area 2.   
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Table 43.  Cedar Hills Wind Farm Summary. 
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Appendix Z  Velva Wind Farm  
 
 
 
 
Figure 227.  Velva Wind Farm Overview 
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Figure 228.  Velva Wind Farm Area 1.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 229.  Velva Wind Farm Area 2.   
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Table 44.  Velva Wind Farm Summary. 
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Appendix AA  Haubenschild Farms Anaerobic Digester Facility  
 
 
 
 
Figure 230.  Haubenschild Farms Location. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 231.  Haubenschild Farms Data. 
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Figure 232.  Haubenschild Farms Permanent Land Disturbances. 
 
 
 
Table 45.  Haubenschild Farms Summary 
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Appendix AB  District 45 Dairy Anaerobic Digester Facility  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 233.  District 45 Dairy Location. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 234.  District 45 Diary Data. 
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Figure 235.  District 45 Dairy Permanent Land Disturbances. 
 
 
 
Table 46.  District 45 Dairy Summary 
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Appendix AC  Northern Plains Dairy Anaerobic Digester Facility  
 
 
 
 
Figure 236.  Northern Plains Dairy Location. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 237.  Northern Plains Diary Data. 
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Figure 238.  Northern Plains Dairy Permanent Land Disturbances. 
 
 
 
Table 47.  Northern Plains Dairy Summary 
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Appendix AD  Midwest Dairy Anaerobic Digester Facility  
 
 
 
 
Figure 239.  Midewest Dairy Location. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 240.  Midwest Dairy Data. 
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Figure 241.  Midwest Dairy Permanent Land Disturbances. 
 
 
 
Table 48.  Midwest Dairy Summary 
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